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Since Justice Thomas' confirmation hearing in 1991, much public
debate and discussion has focused on sexual harassment issues.'
Despite this increased public awareness, the incidence of sexual
harassment in America's schools 2 is widespread. 3 It remains a major
barrier to the ability of schools to provide a non-discriminatory, safe
learning environment in which students can succeed and achieve
their potential.
The elimination of sexual harassment in schools is certainly a high
priority for students, parents and educators. Despite increased
education and public information, a significant number of male and
female students experience some form of sexual harassment during
their school careers. According to a leading study conducted by the
American Association of University Women (AAUW), eighty-five
percent of girls and seventy-six percent of boys in grades eight
1. "The nation's sensitivity to sexual harassment has changed profoundly since October
1991, when Anita Hill's charges against then Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas riveted
Americans to their television sets. Sexual harassment claims filed with the federal government
have increased dramatically, as have damages paid to successful plaintiffs." Sarah Glazer,
Crackdown on Sexual Harassment: Is the Nation Overreacting to the Problem (July 19, 1996) <http://
libraryip.CQ.com/>.
2. As used herein, the term "schools" applies to all public and private educational
institutions that receive federal funds, such as elementary and secondary schools, school
districts, proprietary schools, colleges and universities. See Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,034 (1997) [hereinafter OCR Guidance]. The OCR Guidance provides detailed information
regarding standards to identify, prevent, and resolve sexual harassment allegations made by
students in educational institutions. As indicated in the Guidance, although such standards do
not carry the force of law, "courts generally benefit from, and defer to, the expertise of an
agency with authority." Id. at 12,036. See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994) (defining and
addressing issues arising from discrimination based on sex or blindness); 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-
106.71 (implementing regulations regarding discrimination in educational programs receiving
federal assistance) (1999).
3. In a survey of over 200 female students at more than 20 colleges and universities, 67%
have felt sexually harassed: 16% by a teacher and 41% by another student. Katie Herrick &
Jamilla Coleman, Campus Confidentia4 GLAMOUR MAGAZINE, Sept. 9, 1999, at 190.
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through eleven reported that they experienced some form of sexual
harassment during their school careers. Sixty-six percent of the girls
and forty-nine percent of the boys also reported that they were targets
of sexual harassment "often" or "occasionally."
4
The pervasiveness of sexual harassment occurring in schools,
colleges, and universities substantially interferes with many students'
academic performance, and adversely affects their emotional and
physical well-being.5 The sexually offensive conduct or behavior also
conflicts with the broad educational and social benefits that otherwise
accrue from a diverse academic setting.'
Two recent Supreme Court decisions clarified the responsibilities,
duties, and roles of administrators, faculty, staff, parents, and students
to identify, prevent, and resolve sexual harassment issues in schools.
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,7 the Supreme Court
ruled that a school is liable under Tile IX of the Education
Amendments of 19728 for teacher-on-student sexual harassment.
Liability arises when a school official with authority to take corrective
measures has actual notice of the teacher's sexual harassment and is
"deliberately indifferent" to it.9 In Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education,0  the Supreme Court expanded the "deliberate
indifference" liability standard to cases involving student-on-student
4. See AMERICAN ASSoC. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUND, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE
AAUWA SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 2 (1993) [hereinafter HOSTILE
HALLWAYS] (representing the first national scientific study of sexual harassment in public
schools); Nan Stein, Nancy L. Marshall and Linda R. Tropp, NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND& WELLESLEY COLLEGE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 2 (1993) (reporting that 83% of girls ages 9 to 19 had
been touched, pinched, or grabbed, and 39% reported that this harassment occurred daily).
5. See e.g., Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226 (7th
Cir. 1997) (stating that "a nondiscriminatory environment is essential to maximum intellectual
growth and is therefore an integral part of the educational benefits that a student receives. A
sexually abusive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from developing
her full intellectual potential and receiving the most from the academic program.").
6. SeeWessman v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1998), rev'd, 160 F.3d
790 (1st Cir. 1998) (involving an applicant for admission to a Boston public examination school
who sued the school committee and school officials and challenged their racially and ethically
discriminatory admission policies). The court recognized that:
[o]f great significance is the fact that diversity in the classroom is the most effective of
all weapons in challenging stereotypical preconceptions. When studying side by side,
in a diverse setting, students grow to understand and respect differences among them
as they share life in a complex, pluralistic society. And, as important, they learn that
most people, regardless of their backgrounds, think in fundamentally the same way
about matters of character, team work, and mutual respect
Id. at 128.
7. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
9. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-92.
10. 119 S. Ct 1661 (1999).
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sexual harassment." These decisions also establish that a Title IX
plaintiff must prove that the sexual harassment was "so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive" that it denied the harassed
student equal access to the school's educational opportunities or
benefits.
The Gebser and Davis decisions establish a new Title IX liability
standard that represents a significant change in the way that federal
courts will determine a school's liability for sexual harassment. These
decisions further Title IX's primary goal of eradicating sex
discrimination in schools. They also strengthen the enforcement
tools available to prevent sexual harassment, and to resolve claims as
quickly and effectively as possible.
While Gebser and Davis are instructive, they do not explicitly clarify
the day-to-day responsibilities, duties, and expectations of school
administrators, parents, and students. In this article, Professor Harris
and Mr. Grooms examine a number of key practical issues they
believe potentially undermine the effectiveness of the "deliberate
indifference" liability standard as a tool to prevent and remedy sexual
harassment in educational institutions. The authors believe that
contrary to its intended result, the "deliberate indifference" standard
makes it more difficult for sexually harassed students to invoke Title
IX coverage and its protection.
Professor Harris and Mr. Grooms review Title IX's prohibition
against sex discrimination, including its statutory purposes,
regulatory scheme, and recognition of a private cause of action for
students who allege that teachers or students sexually harassed them,
The authors next analyze the new Title IX liability standards
established under Gebser and Davis, including a comparison to the
more rigorous standards the Supreme Court adopted in 1998 for
workplace sexual harassment cases filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Their analysis includes a review of the key
elements required to establish a school's liability for prohibited
sexual harassment.
The authors conclude with guidance on some of the key questions
the Supreme Court has left unresolved. For example, what
constitutes adequate notice of the sexual harassment to an
appropriate school official? How does a student determine who is a
school official with sufficient authority to correct the alleged sexual
harassment? What are the key factors or considerations for
11. Id. at 1674-75.
12. Id at 1675.
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evaluating the adequacy of a school's response to determine whether
it is "deliberately indifferent," i.e., in what manner did the school
officials fail to reasonably respond and/or take corrective action?
What if the harasser contends that alleged sexual harassment is
protected "free speech"?
I. TITLE IX'S PROHIBITION AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. Title JX Covers Programs and Activities in Schools That Receive Federal
Funds
Congress enacted Title IX to prohibit sex discrimination in
educational institutions that receive federal funding. Title IX states,
in relevant part, that "no person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance. "s The two principal
objectives of Title IX are "to avoid the use of federal resources to
support discriminatory practices" 14 and "to provide individual citizens
effective protection against those practices." is
Title IX applies to all public and private educational institutions
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994). Sexual harassment is a form of sex-based discrimination.
See 29 C.F.R. § 16104.11 (a) (1999) (defining "sexual harassment"). See also Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recounting EEOC's administrative interpretation of the Act in
its 1980 Guideline); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (affirming that Title VII
is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination); Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d
211 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title X
prohibit same sex harassment).
14. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998). In addition to sexual
harassment, Title IX's implementing regulations cover (1) "accommodation" claims wherein a
student alleges sex discrimination because the school did not provide equal athletic
opportunities for members of both sexes, e.g., decisions regarding which varsity teams to field
and how many opportunities existed for female varsity athletes; and (2) "equal treatment"
claims where a student alleges an unequal provision of scholarship funding and other athletic
benefits or opportunities to varsity athletes based on sex. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c) (1999)
(pertaining to athletic scholarships); 106.41 (c) (1)-(10) (1999) (providing factors to determine
if force opportunity exists); see also Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1999)
(contemplating a Title IX violation with regards to women varsity athletic teams); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (identifying three areas of regulatory compliance
under Title IX: athletic financial assistance (scholarships), equivalence in other athletic benefits
and opportunities, and effective accommodation of student interests and abilities). Title IX is
viewed widely as succeeding in giving girls confidence through participation in athletics.
According to Anne Driscoll, author of the soon-to-be published book, "Girl to Girl - Sports and
You: The Real Deal on Being Fit and Having Fun," Title IX "has changed the lives of girls more
than any law since the one that gave women the right to vote by" giving boys and girls "a new
common experience and a new way to interact." Anne Driscoll, Giving Girls a Sporting Chance,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1999, at 18, available in 1999 WL 30398464.
15. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 at 286 (1998) (quoting Cannon v.
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); X. v. Fremont County Sch. Dist., No. 96-8065, 1998
WL 704692, at *3 (10thCir. Oct. 2, 1998).
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that receive federal funds, such as elementary and secondary schools,
school districts, proprietary schools, and colleges and universities.
Title IX protection extends to a school's "education program or
activity."" The Department of Education's (DOE) Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) interprets this provision to include all of the school's
operations, including academic, educational, extra-curricular, and
athletic programs. 7 The provision applies whether the activities or
programs take place in the facilities of the school, on a school bus, at
a class or training program the school sponsors at another location,
or elsewhere.
8
The initial flurry of litigation under Title IX addressed the issue of
when Title IX applies to an educational institution because it is a
"recipient of federal funding."9 Title IX defines a "recipient of
federal funds" to include "any public or private agency, institution, or
organization, or other entity, or any other person, to whom federal
16. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that
the environment at the teaching hospital consisted of a "mixed employment-training context");
Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't. of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 899 F. Supp. 659,
668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that vocational programs at a state correctional facility typically
provided instructors, evaluations, and offered a particular course of training). In O'Connor v.
Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997), the defendant was a state-run clinic that received federal
money and permitted student-interns from Marymount College, with whom it had no
affiliation, to perform volunteer field work at its facility. The clinic contended that it was not
subject to Title IX because it was not an "education program or activity." Id. at 116. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals "'declined' to convert [the clinic's] willingness to accept
volunteers into conduct analogous to administering an 'education program' as contemplated
by Title IX." Id. at 118. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the clinic's internship
program could be viewed as "vocational education." Id. It concluded that education was not
the clinic's "primary purpose," the clinic "accepts no tuition, has no teachers, has no evaluation
process, and requires no regular hours of course study for its volunteer workers." Id. The
Second Circuit refused to impute the fact that Marymount College operated an "education
program" to the clinic "simply because [plaintiff] was a student at the former while she
performed work with the latter." O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 118. Since there was no institutional
affiliation, no written agreement binding the two entities in any way, no sharing of staff
members, and no funds circulated between them, the court found that the connection between
the college and the clinic was "insufficient to establish [the clinic] as an agent or arm of
Marymount for Title IX purposes." Id. at 118-19.
17. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,038 (discussing application of the statute).
18. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,038 (discussing application of the statute in light
of its language "education program or acting").
19. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist. (Kinman II), 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that Title IX will not support an action against a teacher in her individual capacity);
Bracey v. Buchanan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 416, 419 (noting that school officials cannot be sued in
their individual capacity under Title IX because they are not grant recipients); NCAA v. R.M.
Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999) (finding that receipt of dues from federally funded institutions
does not bring an association within Title IX's mandate); see, e.g., Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786,
789 (11th Cir.), vacated and remande, 119 S. Ct 33 (1998) (recounting Title IX basics including
conditions of federal funding); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1018-
19 (7th Cir. 1997) (addressing whether a principal is an appropriate defendant in a Title IX
action); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 722-24 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
Title IX's limited application); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir.
1988) (noting that most Title IX cases raise jurisdictional questions).
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financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient
and which operates an educational program or activity which receives
or benefits from such assistance."20
The Supreme Court initially examined the standards for
determining whether an institution is a "recipient of federal funds" in
Grove City College v. Bell2 Grove City College was a private college that
22
accepted no direct federal assistance. It enrolled, however, many
students who received federal Basic Educational Opportunity Grants
(BEOGs)23 for educational purposes.24
The Supreme Court determined that Title IX applied to Grove City
College because it received tuition money from students who
received federal financial aid.25 Although Grove City College received
federal funds indirectly, through student tuition payments, the
Supreme Court held that application of Title IX did not require an
educational institution to directly receive federal financial assistance.26
It ruled, however, that the students' receipt of federal grants did not
automatically trigger institution-wide Title IX coverage, it only
27triggered coverage of the school's financial aid program.
In response to Grove City, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA). 8 The CRRA expanded the
Supreme Court's restrictive reading of the phrase "program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance."2 It amended Title IX
and other federal anti-discrimination statutes,0 to make the entire
20. 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1999).
21. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
22. Id. at 559.
23. According to the Court, "the structure of the Education Amendments of 1972, in
which Congress both created the BEOG program and imposed Title IX's nondiscrimination
requirement, strongly suggests... [that some of the college's] programs or activities receive
federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX when students finance their
education with BEOGs." Id. at 563.
24. Id at 559.
25. Id. at 563.
26. Id at 564.
27. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 573-74.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 573-74 (limiting the
scope of Title IX application).
30. Several other anti-discrimination laws contain nearly identical language that
determines their scope. See generally Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1994) (prohibiting race discrimination in "any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance"); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in "any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance"); Age Discrimination Act of 1975 § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age in "any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance").
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entity (either state agency or educational institution) subject to Title
IX if one arm of an educational institution (or state agency) receives
federal funds. 2
In NCAA v. Smith,5 the Supreme Court re-examined this coverage
issue in a challenge to a National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) bylaw that prohibited a female student athlete from playing
college varsity volleyball as a graduate student. 4 Smith contended
that the NCAA's receipt of membership dues from its member
institutions qualified it as an indirect recipient of federal funding,
therefore, triggering Title IX coverage.5  The Supreme Court
rejected this approach. It held that the NCAA is not an "indirect
recipient" of federal aid within the reach of Title IX, but merely an
"indirect beneficiary" of such aid.s6
The Supreme Court distinguished Grove City because in that case,
the federal funds were specifically earmarked for educational
expenses."7 In Smith, the student-plaintiff could not assert that federal
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2) (A) (1994) provides that a "program or activity" includes "all of the
operations of... a college, university, or other post-secondary institution, or a public system of
higher education[,] ... any part of which is extended federal financial assistance." It also
provides institution-wide coverage for entities "principally engaged in the business of providing
education" services, and for entities created by two or more covered entities. Id. at §
1687(3) (A) (ii), § 1687(4). See also Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam's, 156 F.3d 321
(2d Cir. 1998). In Bartlett, the court concluded that the CRRA:
does not require an analysis of whether the [state agency] to which the [federal
financial] assistance is "extended" must also be in a position to accept or reject
(statutory] obligations for the strictures of the [statute] to apply. Therefore, although
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Board ever actually elected to accept
federal funds, the lack of such evidence is immaterial.
Id. at 330.
32. See, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding that a tax
exemption constituted "federal financial assistance" in the context of Tide VI, not Title IX);
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(determining that the defendant received federal financial assistance within the meaning of
both Title VI and Tide IX because it received both direct grants and tax-exempt status); M.H.D.
v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797, 801-02 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing that the plaintiff
asserted that the school was a "recipient of federal funds" because of its tax-exempt status and,
since the court of appeals determined that this claim was not "immaterial or wholly frivolous," it
agreed that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit). See also
Association of Mexican American Educators v. State of California, 183 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.
1999) (stating that the definition of "program or activity" means that if any part of the entity
receives federal funds, the entire entity is covered under Title IX).




37. Compare Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984) with United States Dept. of
Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986) where the Supreme Court held
that airlines are not recipients of federal funds received by airport operators for airport
construction projects, even when the funds are used for projects specifically beneficial to the
airlines.
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funds the NCAA member institutions received were earmarked for
payments of NCAA dues.3s Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that
the NCAA was not covered under Title IX because it was merely "an
entity that benefits from federal assistance."39
B. Expanding Title 1X To Recognize A Private Cause of Action for Sexual
Harassment
Although the standards governing an employer's liability for sexual
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' have
developed rapidly in the employment context,41 the same is not true
in a school setting under Title IX. Before the Supreme Court
examined whether schools are liable for teacher-on-student sexual
harassment in 1998, its jurisprudence regarding an educational
institution's liability under Title IX42 was limited to whether Title IX
38. Smith, 529 U.S. at 929.
39. Id. at 929-30. The Supreme Court declined to address two alternative theories for
bringing the NCAA under the prescriptions of Title IX because it could not "decide in the first
instance issues not decided [by the court] below." Id. at 930.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in
relevant part, that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2 (a) (1).
41. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) and Burlington
Inds., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 75, 78-9 (determining that an employer is vicariously liable for a
supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate employee); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination consisting of
same sex harassment).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). In North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982),
the Supreme Court held that Title IX must be accorded "a sweep as broad as its language." As
discussed above, the cases that the Supreme Court reviewed, required it to resolve whether a
program received federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX. Those federal
courts of appeals reaching the liability standard concluded that Title VII case law provided the
most appropriate guidance in determining whether actionable sexual harassment occurred
under Title IX. See Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing
same sex harassment); Brine v. University of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 275-76 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied; 519 U.S. 1149 (1997) (noting that the elements of procedure for the two statutes are
slightly different); Doe v. Claiborne County ld. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that harassment allegations constitute a hostile work environment); Torres v. Pisano,
116 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the applicability of Title VII standards to a Title IX
private right of action); Preston v. Virginia ex reL New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203,
207 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that McDonnell Douglas standard applies in Title IX cases); Ivan
v. Kent State Univ., 863 F. Supp. 581, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1994), af/'d mem., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir.
1996) (deciding the relationship between Title VII and Title IX claims); Waid v. Merrill Area
Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "by enacting Title IX Congress created
a strong incentive for schools to adopt policies that protect federal civil rights"); Roberts v.
Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993)
(considering whether Title IX requires a showing of discriminatory intent similar to Title VII);
Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 315 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987) (discussing differences in the basis of a claim under Title
VII or IX).
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included a private cause of action.43
Title IX does not explicitly provide a private cause of action for sex
discrimination, including sexual harassment, at schools. 4   It
established, however, a complex administrative enforcement scheme
to ensure compliance with its non-discrimination provisions." An
aggrieved individual can file a complaint with the Department of
Education (DOE) which is authorized to conduct investigations and
engage in fact-finding.46 The DOE can also conduct its own periodic
review. If the DOE finds a violation, it can attempt to informally
resolve the matter. 8 If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the DOE
can seek compliance by terminating the institution's federal funding
after an administrative hearing.49
In 1979, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether Title IX permitted enforcement beyond the administrative
remedies available under the DOE complaint process. In Cannon v.
University of Chicago,0 it ruled that there was an implied private right
of action for individuals to enforce Title IX. The Supreme Court
recognized a private cause of action in addition to remedies already
available under Title IX's administrative enforcement mechanism."'
Prior to Cannon, courts used federal funding cut-offs 2 as the exclusive
43. Despite the Supreme Court's lack of guidance, the DOE has interpreted Title IX for
well over a decade. See 34 C.F.R § 106.1-106.71 (1999).
44. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a) and 1682 (1994) (providing a general prohibition against
discrimination and federal administrative enforcement). See also Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d
452, 463 (D. R.I. 1999).
45. See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist, 163 F.3d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1998)
(relating this scheme as a foreclosure to use of§ 1983 in implementing Title IX).
46. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (1999) (explaining conduct of investigation where any person
can file a complaint of discrimination within 180 days unless excepted).
47. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (A) (1999) (discussing periodic compliance reviews).
48. See id § 100.7(d) (1) (providing for informal resolution when a prompt department
investigation finds compliance failure).
49. See id § 100.8 (establishing procedures for effecting compliance).
50. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Cannon alleged that she was denied admission to the University
of Chicago medical school program in violationtof Title IX because of her sex. Id. at 680. The
district court dismissed her claim on the ground that Tite IX provided neither an explicit nor
an implicit private right of action. Id. at 685-88. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision. Id. at 688-89. The Supreme Court held that the traditional method
of enforcing Title IX by cutting off federal funding would not always be sufficient to fulfill
congressional goals in enacting Tide IX. Id. at 688-89. It identified these goals as a desire "to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and "to provide
individual citizens effective protection against those practices." Id. at 704-06.
51. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535-36 (1982), (affirming the
Second Circuit's finding that federal funds could be terminated for discrimination visited upon
employees and students of educational programs). The Court did not address the availability of
a private right of action for employees of such programs. Id.
52. A similar enforcement scheme is employed to combat racial harassment under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to 2000d-7, which served as a model for
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means of enforcing Title IX."'
More than a decade after its Cannon decision, the Supreme Court
revisited Title IX challenges in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.5 In Franklin, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of
remedies available to a successful private litigant in a suit brought
pursuant to the Cannon implied right of action.5 In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court held that monetary damages are
available as a remedy to enforce Title IX when a teacher sexually
harasses a student. 6
As part of its analysis, the Supreme Court reexamined its decision
in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,17 in which it had
reviewed Congress' power to legislate under the Spending Clause.'
In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court stated that:
"legislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power is much in the nature of a contract: in return
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of
Congress' power to legislate under the spending
power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'
[citation omitted] There can, of course, be no
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the
conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected
of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do
so unambiguously. [citation omitted]" 9
Title IX.
53. "During the decade following Cannon, plaintiffs used Tide IX to obtain injunctive and
declaratory relief. It remained unsettled, however, whether a plaintiff could receive monetary
damages for violations of the statute." Courtney G. Joslin, Recognizing a Cause of Action Under
Title IX for Student-Student Sexual Harassment, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201,207 (1999).
54. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
55. Christine Franklin, a tenth grade student, alleged that she was subjected to continual
sexual harassment (consisting of verbal and physical conduct, including forcible sexual
intercourse) from Andrew Hill, a sports coach and teacher at the North Gwinnett High School.
Id. at 60. Franklin's complaint further alleged that school officials were aware of and
investigated Hill's conduct with other female students, but failed to intervene and even
discouraged Franklin from pressing charges against Hill. The district court had dismissed
Franklin's complaint because it held that Title IX did not authorize an award of damages and
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeais affirmed. Id. at 63-64.
56. Id. at 61-62.
57. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To Lay and Collect
Taxes ... to ... provide for the... general Welfare of the United States." Id.
59. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
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When a school violates Title IX, the DOE is authorized to withhold
its funding pursuant to the Spending Clause analysis.6" Title IX
conditions federal funding assistance on the school's promise not to
61discriminate based on sex. In addition, as the Fourth Circuit
explained in Litman v. George Mason University," Title IX "also
conditions these funds on the [school's] consent to be sued in
federal court for an alleged breach of the promise not to
discriminate."63
The Franklin Court explained that the result will be different when
the school unintentionally violates statutory conditions. "In
Pennhurst, [we] observed that remedies were limited under such
Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation was
unintentional .... The point of not permitting monetary damages for
an unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds
lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award." 4 The court
found that:
this notice problem does not arise in a case... in which intentional
discrimination is alleged. Unquestionably, Title IX placed a duty
on the Gwinnett County Schools not to discriminate on the basis of
sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because
of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate [s]' on the
basis of sex. We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher
sexually harasses and abuses a student."6
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) (allowing federal departments extending federal financial
assistance to effectuate compliance through a termination of benefits). See also supra notes 7-10
and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions addressing sexual
harassment in schools and liability).
61. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17-18 (interpreting and applying Title IX to schools).
62. 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999).
63. The Fourth Circuit referenced 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) which amended Tide IX to
make explicit that "[a] state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in federal court for a violation of... Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972." Litman, 186 F.3d at 551 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Klemencic v.
Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 918 (S.D. Ohio, 1998) (recounting the recently imposed
standards to hold an educational institution liable under Title IX as actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference). The Eleventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "tie
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX. It is also well established that the Eleventh Amendment precludes citizens
from bringing suits in federal court against their own states. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 9 (1890) (discussing the jurisdiction of federal courts); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
2265 (1999) (discussing the constitutional immunity of states against private suits).
64. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). In Smith v. Metropolitan
Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1034 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2367 (1998), the Seventh
Circuit held that the proper Title IX standard for imposing liability on schools is "actual
knowledge." The Seventh Circuit's analysis was based on its finding that the Spending Clause
requires intentional discrimination to allow for a damages recovery, and on the basis that Title
IX does not include agency language. Id. at 1029-30.
65. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)
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The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that Gwinnett County
school officials were on notice that they could be found liable for
intentionally discriminating against a student under Title IX. "
II. DEFINING THE STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY UNDER TITLE
IX
While the Cannon67 and Franklin" decisions recognized a private
cause of action under Title IX, the Supreme Court did not set forth
standards for determining when a school is liable under Title IX for
sexual harassment by teachers or students until its decisions in Gebsed'
and Davis.7
A. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
During the 1990-1991 academic year, Frank Waldrop, a teacher at
Lago Vista High School, met Alida Gebser, an eighth-grade student,
in his wife's honors class.71 The following year, as a ninth-grader, Ms.
Gebser was assigned to Mr. Waldrop's advanced social studies class
72
and their relationship grew. In the spring of 1992, Mr. Waldrop
initiated sexual contact with Ms. Gebser when he visited her at home
knowing that she would be alone." During the summer of 1992,
Waldorp and Gebser had a sexual relationship.74 She was fifteen years
(recognizing sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII)).
The Supreme Court did not determine whether Title IX proscribes teacher-on-student sexual
harassment. It merely addressed what remedies were available under Title IX for sexual
harassment. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72-74. In Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the Supreme Court's suggestion that teacher-on-student
sexual harassment gives rise to a cause of action under Title IX as arguably dicta. 120 F.3d
1390, 1400 n.14 (l1th Cir. 1997).
66. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75. Notwithstanding its discussion of the Pennhurst case and the
Spending Clause, the Supreme Court refused to decide whether, in enacting Title IX, Congress
used its Spending Clause power, or whether it did so pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead the Court conclude [d] "that a money damages remedy is available under
Title IX for an intentional violation irrespective of the constitutional source of Congress' power
to enact the statute." Id. at 75 n.8. In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719
(1982), the Supreme Court discussed Congress' goal of promoting equality in enacting Tide IX
and treated it as enacted pursuant to Congress' power granted by section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to enforce that Amendment." Id. at 719.
67. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
68. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
69. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
70. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
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old.75 In January 1993, a Lago Vista police officer discovered the two
• • 76
engaged in sexual intercourse. Waldrop was arrested and
terminated from his employment. 7 Waldrop's teaching license was
later revoked. 7
Ms. Gebser did not report the relationship to school officials or to
her parents. 7 She did not dispute the fact that "there was no direct
evidence that any school official was aware of Waldrop's sexual
exploitation" until January 1993 when the police officer exposed the
relationship.8 o
Gebser filed suit against the Lago Vista School District alleging that
her rights were violated under Title IX."' The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Lago Vista. 2 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed .
B. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
When LaShonda Davis was a fifth-grader (during the 1992-1993
academic year) at the Hubbard Elementary School in Monroe
County, Georgia, a classmate, identified only as G.F., began to harass
her during school hours.8 * According to the complaint, G.F.'s
behavior began in December 1992 and continued through May
19 93 .' G.F. repeatedly attempted to touch LaShonda's breasts and
genital area and made vulgar statements to her such as "I want to get
in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs."86  After each
incident, LaShonda notified her classroom teacher, Ms. Fort, and her
mother.8 7 LaShonda's mother contacted Ms. Fort as well and was
informed that Principal Bill Querry had been made aware of the
75. Id.
76. Lago Vista, 106 F.3d at 1225.
77. Bernadette Marczely, Mixed Messages: Sexual Harassment in the Public Schools, THE
CLEARrNG HOUSE, 1999 WL 11744223, at *2 (discussing the facts of Gebser v. Lago Vista).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Logo Vrsta, 106 F.3d at 1225.
81. Gebser also sued the school district for negligence under Texas state law (not pursued
on appeal) and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lago Vista, 106 F.3d at 1225. Plaintiff appealed
only the summary judgment on her Title IX claim. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1223.
84. Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ. 862 F. Supp. 363, 364 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
85. Id. at 364-65.
86. Id. at 364.
87. Id
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incident.
In February 1993, "while in gym class, G.F. placed a door stop in his
pants and behaved in a sexually suggestive manner towards
LaShonda. She reported this incident to her gym teacher."'9 In
March or April 1993, LaShonda and a group of girls, who G.F. also
harassed, decided they should talk to Queery about the situation."
Ms. Fort denied their request to go to Querry's office.9' "The
complaint further alleges that LaShonda's assigned seat in Ms. Fort's
class was next to G.F.'s seat."92 It was more than three months after
her frequent complaints began that Ms. Fort allowed LaShonda to
change her seating assignment.93
LaShonda's "previously high grades dropped as she became unable
to concentrate on her studies and, in April 1993, her father
discovered that she had written a suicide note."9 When LaShonda
sought assistance from Queery in May 1993, he asked her why she
"was the only one complaining."5 LaShonda told her mother that
she "didn't know how much longer she could keep [G.F.] off her.""
LaShonda's mother then called the school board's superintendent to
complain about G.F. and Querry.97 G.F. was charged with sexual
battery in May 1993.9" He plead guilty to the charge.99
LaShonda's mother filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia against the School Board, the School
District's superintendent, and Querry'0 The complaint alleged that
the School Board violated Tide DI ' through their failure to protect
LaShonda from G.F.'s unwelcome sexual advances which created an
88. Id. at 365.
89. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 365.




94. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 365.
95. Id-
96. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1999) (quoting from the
complaint at paragraph 12).
97. Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363,365 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
98. Id. at 365.
99. Idt
100. Id. at 364.
101. In addition to her Tide IX claim, Davis' lawsuit included allegations that defendants
violated her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These sections discuss the
right of an individual to hold others liable for violation of their civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983. ChiefJudge Owens granted qualified immunity to defendants Querry and Dumas
(the School District's superintendent). AureliaD., 862 F. Supp. at 367.
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intimidating, hostile, offensive and abusive school environment.'
The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted."3 It
interpreted Title IX as authorizing relief only when a plaintiff is
subjected to discrimination under "any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.',14 Since the court found that
"the sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not part of
a school program or activity," it concluded that LaShonda's mental
and emotional stress "was not proximately caused by a federally-
funded educational provider."'0 '5
A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reinstated plaintiff's claim.' ° The appeals court found that "as Title
VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile
working environment created by co-workers and tolerated by the
employer, Tide IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually
hostile educational environment created by a fellow student or
students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to
eliminate the harassment.",
0 7
The School Board's motion for rehearing en banc was granted and
the full panel upheld the district court's dismissal of the case."'
Focusing first on Title IX's legislative history, Chief Judge Tjoflat
explained that Title IX mirrored Title VI, rather than Tide VII, in its
construction.'9 In a footnote, Chief Judge Tjoflat identified three
reasons for the Court's refusal to use Tide VII standards of liability:
(1) Congress could have worded Title IX as it had worded Title VII,
but it did not; (2) while Title VII was enacted under the Commerce
Clause, Tide IX was not; and (3) liability under Title VII is
102. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Edu., 120 F.3d 1390, 1394 (quoting from the complaint
at paragraphs 27-28).
103. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367-68.
104. Id. at 367 n.3 (quoting Tide IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)). Title IX 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2) (B)
defines a "program or activity" as encompassing "all the operations of... a local educational
agency... or other school system.").
105. Id.
106. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d at 1195 (1lth Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 1193.
108. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d at 1392 (11th Cir. 1997), afj'g9l F.3d
1418 (1996). The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, considered only Davis' Tide IX claim
against the School Board since she did not appeal the dismissal of her Title IX claims against
the individual defendants, Dumas and Querry, nor did she appeal the dismissal of her § 1981
claim. Id. at 1392. The three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit rejected Davis' § 1983 claim
that she had expanded it to include a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 1392 n. 3.
109. Id. at 1398 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6546 (1964) and 117 CONG, REC. at 30, among
other references to the Congressional Record).
590
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determined based on agency principles that are irrelevant in the Title
IX context where students are not "agents" of the school.""
C. Supreme Court Analysis
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in Gebser"' and in Davis,
1 1 2
to determine under what circumstances a school is liable for the
independent misconduct'13  of a teacher and student. Justice
O'Connor, who delivered the majority opinion in both cases,"14
observed in Gebser that "it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Tite IX to
permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's
sexual harassment of a student based on principles of respondeat
superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school
district official."" 5 A year later in Davis, Justice O'Connor concluded
that [a school board] may be liable for 'subject[ing]' [sic] their
students to discrimination where [it] is deliberately indifferent to
known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser
is under the school's disciplinary authority.""
6
In Gebser, Justice O'Connor distinguished Title IX from Title VII
whose language explicitly calls for the application of agency
principles in determining an employer's liability."7  In addition to
this difference in statutory construction,"8 the Supreme Court in
110. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1400 n.13.
111. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
112. 119S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
113. In Davis, the Court observed that it has "elsewhere concluded that sexual harassment is
a form of discrimination for Title IX purposes." Id. at 1674.
114. A slim 5-4 majority determined the outcome in both cases. In GebserJustice O'Connor
vasjoined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Gebser, 524 U.S. at
276. The Davis majority consisted ofJustices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1666.
115. Gebserv. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,276 (1998).
116. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661,1673 (1999).
117. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-88 (analyzing the language used in each Act). Tire VII
prohibits an employer from discriminating against employees and applicants for employment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It includes "any agent" in its definition of employer. Id. See Floyd v.
Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 788-793 (11 Cir. 1998) (involving the Eleventh Circuit's explicit
rejection of agency liability as a basis for Tite IX claims). The court concluded that "there
must be actual notice of the sexually harassing behavior by the school board or school
superintendent in order for there to be a claim against the school system under Title IX." Id. at
285.
118. In Howard v. Bd. of Educ. of Sycamore Community Unit Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 959, 974
(N.D. Ill. 1995), the district court found that "actual notice" is the correct standard for
imposing liability to the educational institution, based on the following rationale: "When
Congress enacted Title IX, it expressly revoked the former exclusion in Title VII that prohibited
Title VII claims from being brought against an educational institution. Had Congress desired
to expressly incorporate the agency language of Title VII into Title IX, it very easily could have
done so then or since." Id. at 974. In McCue v. State ofKansas Dep't. of Human Resources, 165 F.3d
784 (10th Cir. 1999), a workplace sexual harassment case brought under Title VII, to restrict
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Gebser concluded that Congress would have intended"" to limit the
scope of available remedies under Title IX had they addressed the
issue of employer liability. 21 It also observed that Title IX's
contractual framework was modeled after Title VI' 2 ' The court
refused, therefore, to adopt "wholesale" Title VII principles to Title
IX cases.
122
For cases brought pursuant to Title IX, the Supreme Court
rejected the agency principle of respondeat superio& as well as the
negligence principle of constructive notice that applies in Title VII
cases.'24 It held that the purpose of Title IX is to protect individuals
against federal funding recipients who misuse such "federal resources
to support discriminatory practices" whereas Title VII seeks to
compensate victims of discrimination. 2" Justice O'Connor clarified
liability, defendants argued that principles of agency ought not to apply in Title VII cases since
they do not apply under Title IX. Defendants attempted to analogize the two statutes in order
to avoid responsibility under repondeat superior for the actions of a supervisor vis-k-vis an
employee. AN. at 788. The Tenth Circuit cited Gebser, noting that Title VII and Title IX differ in
"language, form, purpose, and content," which "preclude any reasonable analogies between
them with regard to the applicability of respondeat superior in actions maintained under each
statute." Id at 788.
119. "We attempt to infer how the [1972] Congress would have addressed the issue had
the... action been included as an express provision in the statute." Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285
(1998) (quoting Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 178
(1994)). Although Title IX's legislative history does not provide guidance with respect to the
liability issue, the First Circuit in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico invokes a House Report
"strongly suggest[ing] that Congress meant for similar substantive standards to apply under
Title IX as had been developed under Title VII." See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 897 (1988); see also H.R1REP. No. 92-554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A-N. 2462.
120. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285-86.
121. The Supreme Court noted that both Titles VI and IX specifically condition federal
funding on a recipient's promise not to discriminate. Id. at 286. As in Franklin, the Supreme
Court contrasted Title IX from Title VII which contains an outright prohibition against
discrimination. Id. at 286-89.
122. See Id. In Morlock v. West Central Edua Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 907 (D. Minn. 1999),
the district court observed that "the Gebser Court's rejection of agency principals [sic] as a
ground for teacher against student harassment Title IX liability leaves little logical basis for
distinguishing between peer harassment and teacher harassment suits." It held, therefore that
Gebsersupported a finding that peer harassment was actionable. Id. at 907.
123. OCR Guidance indicates that it applies agency principles for imposing liability on
schools when the harasser is one of the school's employees. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at
12, 039. The Guidance explains that, contrary to OCR policy, the Fifth Circuit held that a
school could not be found liable under Title IX pursuant to agency principles where the
school's male karate instructor repeatedly initiated sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year old
female student. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12, 039 (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind.
School Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (d)
(1958) (discussing principles governing the delegation of authority to or authorization of
another person to act on one's behalf); R. GAULL SILBERMAN, EEOC NOTICE NUMBER N-915-050
(1990).
124. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285.
125. Id. at 286 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
592
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"[t]hat [the] reference [we made] to Meritor [in the Franklin
decision] was made with regard to the general proposition that
sexual harassment can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex
under Title IX.
26
In Davis, the Supreme Court declared that, "we have repeatedly
treated Title IX as legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' authority
under the Spending Clause.' 27 Justice O'Connor reiterated the
Gebser Court's conclusion that "the scope of liability in private
damages actions under Title IX is circumscribed by Pennhurst's
requirement that funding recipients have notice of their potential
liability.' 21 The Supreme Court then clarified its reasoning by
holding that "this limitation on private damages actions is not a bar
to liability where a funding recipient intentionally violates the
statute.
' 29
The Gebser Court held, therefore, that compensatory damages are
available under Title IX only when a plaintiff can establish intentional
discrimination on the part of the school district.3° An educational
institution's liability is predicated on its "deliberate indifference" to
notice of misconduct in an institutional program. 3  Justice
O'Connor stated that for liability to attach to the educational
institution, there must be an official decision by the recipient of
federal funds not to remedy the situation after the alleged
discriminatory conduct has been brought to the attention of an
126. Id. at 283.
127. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1669. Although the Supreme Court indicates that it has "treated"
Tide IX as Spending Clause legislation, it has not yet determined the source of power under
which Congress passed this legislation. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's analysis in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). As
previously discussed, the Supreme Court declined to consider this issue in Franklin and, in
Gebs , without any analysis. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text (analyzing the
Supreme Courts' interpretation of legislative intent and Tide IX). The Court assumed that the
issue was resolved.
128. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287-88).
129. Id. at 1670 (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (emphasis added).
130. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93. Like the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, in Doe v.
University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 1998) found that the school's failure to respond
promptly to known sexual harassment is itself intentional discrimination based on sex. Contrast,
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861,
where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals framed the issue as follows: "whether the recipient of
federal education funds can be found liable for sex discrimination when the perpetrator is a
party other than the grant recipient or its agents." Id. at 1010. It found that Title IX "applies
only to the practices of the recipients themselves, not to third parties." Id. at 1013. Therefore,
based on this analysis, "a school [can] be found liable under Tire IX for peer sexual
harassment only if it treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harassment
of girls." Id. at 1016.
131. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
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"appropriate person. '' 32
Likewise, the majority in Davis found that the Monroe County
Board of Education can be held liable for damages under Title IX
only for its own misconduct, i.e., its own decision to remain idle in the
face of known student-on-student harassment in its schools, and not
for the student's actions. 13' Responding to anticipated criticism from
school officials that they would be held liable for actions of third-
parties outside their control, the Supreme Court explained that it
had not "expanded" the scope of liability beyond the recipients of
federal funds.'"4 Invoking Title IX directly, Justice O'Connor opined
that students are not only protected from discrimination, but also
specifically shielded from being "excluded from participation in" or
"denied the benefits of' any "education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance" on the basis of gender.5-
The Supreme Court was naturally concerned about recipients of
federal funding who are genuinely interested in promoting Title IX's
goal of maintaining discrimination-free educational environments.
Such recipients may not know of alleged discriminatory practices
taking place in their "programs or activities." In accordance with
Title IX's express means of enforcement, these institutions must be
given the opportunity to correct the misconduct before federal
funding is withdrawn."6
III. ANALYZING KEY ELEMENTS OF THE "DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE" STANDARD TO ESTABLISH TITLE IX LIABILITY
We will use the following hypothetical case to closely analyze the
132. Id. at 290. The Supreme Court found that an appropriate person is, "at a minimum, an
official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the
discrimination." Id.
133. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670-75. The Department of Education's sexual harassment
guidance provides that:
[A] school's failure to respond to the existence of a hostile environment within its own
programs or activities permits an atmosphere of sexual discrimination to permeate the
educational program and results in discrimination prohibited by Title IX. Conversely,
if, upon notice of hostile environment harassment, a school takes immediate and
appropriate steps to remedy the hostile environment, the school has avoided violating
Title IX. Thus, Title IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of
harassing students, but rather for its own discrimination in failing to remedy it once
the school has notice.
OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,039-40.
134. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670-75.
135. Id. at 1669-70 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999)).
136. Department of Education regulations require notice of a violation to the appropriate
Department official or person, as well as an opportunity for voluntary compliance before
administrative proceedings can commence. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.8(c)-(d); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at
282 (discussing Department of Education regarding harassment carried out by a teacher).
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impact of the Gebser-Davis "deliberate indifference" standard on a
student's ability to allege and prove a school's Title IX liability for
prohibited sexual harassment. While we will review all elements of
the Gebser-Davis liability standard, we will focus on the three elements
we believe are the most difficult for a student-plaintiff to establish: (1)
that the unwelcome sexual conduct was so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it denied the student equal access to the
school's educational opportunities or benefits; 37 (2) that the school
had actual notice of the alleged harassment;ls and (3) that the school
was "deliberately indifferent," to the sexual harassment and failed to
take appropriate corrective action to remedy it.1
39
A. Hypothetical
Naomi Young is a 20 year old "Deans List" student at Fairness
University. At the beginning of her junior year, Naomi began
working as a researcher forJames Lewis, an associate professor in the
Psychology Department. Naomi was also enrolled in an early
childhood development seminar that James taught weekly.
After working together for four weeks, Naomi began to date James.
They had several lunch and dinner meetings/dates during the next
few weeks. Naomi also accompanied James to several University
social functions, including at least two dinner meetings at the home
of William Tyson, Chair of the Psychology Department. During this
period, James' comments on Naomi's research activities and
classroom participation were very positive and supportive. By mid-
October, Naomi was becoming increasingly concerned about her
relationship with James. He was placing more demands on her social
time, and was becoming more insistent about initiating an intimate
sexual relationship. Naomi was also concerned about James'
behavior: he called her several times each day, repeatedly questioned
her about her whereabouts, asked her about her prior "boyfriends,"
and showed up unannounced at her apartment at least five times, the
most recent incident occurring at 1:30 a.m. Naomi also began to hear
comments from other students in her seminar about how she was
sure to receive an "A" in the course.
Naomi began to have misgivings about their relationship. She felt
that James' behavior was becoming more erratic and controlling.
After her seminar class one day, Naomi told James that she could no
137. See Davis, 199 S. Ct. at 1675 (defining sexual harassment under Tire IX).
138. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291 (stating that the knowledge of the wrongdoer is unrelated
to actual notice).
139. See id. at 20.
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longer date him. James became very loud, yelled at her, and insisted
that their relationship was not over. During their conversation, James
reminded Naomi that he was responsible for her seminar grade.
While James was berating Naomi, Professor Tyson walked by the
classroom. Although he overheard some of what James said and
realized thatJames was quite upset, Professor Tyson did not intervene
in any manner.
James continued to call Naomi several times a day. He sent her a
number of hand-written notes and e-mail messages in which he
repeatedly asked Naomi to meet him for dinner, or come to his
apartment. Naomi declined all of his invitations. James also became
more critical of Naomi's in-class contributions and her written work.
He began to return her research assignments as inadequate and
superficial. The last incident occurred when James verbally abused
Naomi at the end of last week's seminar, and physically threatened
her if she did not go out with him.
Naomi began having difficulty sleeping. Her concentration began
to waver, and her work in other classes began to slip. Naomi was
particularly apprehensive about James showing up at her apartment,
and becoming physically abusive.
In 1997, Naomi had attended a meeting on sexual harassment
issues as part of her new student orientation. During this meeting,
she received a student code of conduct that described Fairness
University's sexual harassment policies and complaint procedures.
The University did not reissue its sexual harassment policy in
subsequent academic years.
B. KEYELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH TITLE IX LIABILITY FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
To establish the University's Title IX liability for prohibited sexual
harassment, Naomi must allege and prove that:140
1411. She is a member of a protected group based on her sex;
2. She was subjected to unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, i.e.,
quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment;
1 2
3. The sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively
140. See e.g., Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 154 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir.
1998) (explicating the standards to state a Title IX claim); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232
(10th Cir. 1996) (listing the elements that must be proven to succeed on a claim of sexual
harassment); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the plaintiff must prove six elements to demonstrate liability under Tile IX).
141. SeeMorse, 154 F.3d 1127 (1998).
142. Id.
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offensive that it deprived her of access to the University's
educational opportunities or benefits;
1 4 1
4. A University official with authority to take corrective measures
had actual knowledge or notice of the sexual harassment; and 144
5. Despite such knowledge, the University official was deliberately
indifferent to the sexual harassment, and failed to reasonably
respond"5
1. Naomi Is A Member of A Protected Group Based On Her Sex
The easiest element for Naomi to satisfy is that she is a member of
a protected group because Title IX prohibits sex discrimination
against "any person." It protects, therefore, both male and female
students from sexual harassment by school employees, other
students, or third parties (in limited circumstances).146 Naomi need
only show thatJames would not have targeted her for harassment but
for her sex, or that her sex played a role in or otherwise affected the
nature of James' alleged misconduct.1 47 Accordingly, Naomi should
easily be able to establish that she is a member of a protected group
based on her gender. 
1 4
Although not applicable to Naomi's case, Title IX also prohibits
sexual harassment by a school employee or a peer even if the student
and the harasser are of the same sex, so-called "same-sex sexual
harassment." 149 The critical inquiry is whether the student can show
that the harasser treated him or her differently from other students




146. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a); OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,039-40.
147. See Righting the Wrongs: A Legal Guide to Understanding Addressing and Preventing Sexual
Harassment in Schools, National Women's Law Center 11 (1998).
148. See Haines v. Metro. Gov't. of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999 (M.D. Tenn.
1998) (declaring that "it is undisputed that [the plaintiff], as a female, is a member of a
protected class).
149. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that
nothing in Title VII "necessarily bars" a discrimination claim because the victim and the
harasser are of the same sex). See also OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,039 (citing Kinman v.
Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist. (Kinman I), 94 F.3d 463, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1996), which concluded that a
female student's sexual harassment allegation is sufficient to state a Title IX claim); Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1564-75 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that a female
student stated an actionable Title IX claim when she alleged sexual harassment by other
students, including males and females).
150. The EEOC's long-standing policy is that a same sex claim is actionable under Title VII
provided that the plaintiff alleges that the harassment was based on gender, and not sexual
orientation. SeeEEOC, EEOC COMPLIANcE MANUAL, No. 615.2(b) (3) (1982).
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teacher abuses or assaults male students,'5' and when female students
repeatedly send sexually explicit graffiti to another female student. 2
The more difficult Title IX claim to assert is one that involves
comments or behavior based on a student's actual or perceived
sexual orientation. The complexity of these types of Title IX claims is
exacerbated because many students report that they would be "very
upset" if other students or school employees called them "gay" or
"lesbian."153
Sexual harassment directed at gay or lesbian students is generally
not actionable under Title IX unless it is based on the victims'
"sex."'54  If a male student alleged that other students repeatedly
taunted or heckled him because of his sexual orientation, he
probably cannot establish harassment because of his sex.' If,
however, a male student or a group of male students "target a lesbian
student for physical sexual advances," the lesbian student can state a
claim of a hostile or abusive educational environment based on her
sex.'56 The student's burden is to show that the harasser's actions or
comments involved prohibited sexual conduct, not merely comments
based on the student's sexual orientation or some other non-
discriminatory factor.1
57
2. Naomi Was Subjected to Unwelcome Conduct Of A Sexual Nature
Under Tide IX, sexual harassment is unwelcome behavior because
it interferes with a student's ability to "learn, study, work, achieve, or
151. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding a third-grade
male teacher's sexual molestation of numerous male students actionable under Title IX).
152. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,039 (providing standards to identify, prevent
and resolve sexual harassment).
153. 17% of public school students, grades eight through eleven, reported that they were
called gay or lesbian when they did not want to be. See HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 9.
86% of all respondents reported that they would be very upset if they were called "gay" or
"lesbian." See HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 10. For male students, this is considered the
"most disturbing form of unwanted behavior." See HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 23.
154. In addition to the EEOC, the federal courts have held that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation because such conduct is not based on the plaintiff's
sex. See generally Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990) (affirming a lower court decision which held that homosexuality is
a status that is not protected under Tide VII); DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone, 608 F.2d 327, 330
(9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that homosexuals are not a protected class); Dillon v. Frank, No.
90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *7 (6th Cir.Jan. 15, 1992) (holding that taunting, physical beatings,
and harassment by co-workers because of plaintiff's homosexuality are not covered under Title
VII).
155. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,039.
156. Id.
157. Several state and local laws prohibit sexual discrimination based on sexual orientation.
See e.g., M.G.L, 151B, § 1.
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participate in school activities.'' 15 For this element, Naomi must
establish that James' sexual conduct was "offensive" or
"unwelcome."'5'9 She must show, therefore, that she did not "solicit or
incite the sexual conduct," and "regarded [it] as undesirable or
offensive." 6 ' In this context, Naomi must demonstrate that she
unequivocally indicated to James that his conduct was unwelcome,
and that she did not initiate or otherwise continue their
relatonship.'61
In a school environment, unwelcome harassment may take several
forms of verbal,' 6 physical, 63 visual,'6 and non-verbal conduct& The
prohibited conduct generally covers a wide range of harassment,'6
158. NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, Do THE RIGHT THING: UNDERSTANDING,
ADDRESSING, AND PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS, 5 (1998).
159. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (defining conduct
that constitutes sexual harassment).
160. Id.
161. Id. For younger or less mature students, a fact-finder may be required to evaluate the
degree to which they are able to recognize that there is certain conduct to which they can or
should "reasonably object," and the degree to which the students can articulate an objection.
For older students like Naomi, a fact-finder can evaluate whether the sexual harassment was
unwelcome based on the totality of the factual circumstances. Key considerations include the
following types of information: (1) wimess statements regarding the alleged incidents, (2)
corroborative evidence supporting the credibility of the student's statement such as the level of
detail or consistency, or that of the alleged harasser, (3) evidence of prior harassment, or prior
false allegations, (4) evidence of the student's reaction or behavior after the alleged
harassment, including whether they filed a complaint or took other action, and (5) other
contemporaneous evidence such as the students talking with their parents or friends. OCR
Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,042.
162. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-88 (1998) (requiring
typically innocent and nonoffensive behavior like teasing and joking to be of an extremely
offensive nature to qualify as sexual harassment). This category includes unwelcome teasing,
jokes, insults, sexual innuendoes or double entendres, sexual suggestive comments about a
student's body, clothing, or physical appearance, stories or questions of a sexual nature, asking
about intimate or personal details of another individual's sexual interests or behavior, pressure
for dates or sexual favors, promises of educational advancement in return for sexual favors,
sexually suggestive sounds, directing discussions or conversations into sexual topics, use of
labels such as "honey," "hunk," "sweetie," or use of obscene language with sexual overtones. Id.
163. See Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1997) (alleging physical
sexual harassment to include stroking, patting, and massaging the shoulders). This covers
physical conduct such as unwelcome kissing, touching, patting, pinching, rubbing against,
stroking, fondling, grabbing, assault, cornering, or other physical conduct of a sexual nature, or
coerced sexual intercourse. Id. at 980.
164. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1501 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (describing pictures of nude women and sexual suggestive posters as a visual assault on
the senses). Examples of visual conduct include posters, pictures, calendars, cartoons,
drawings, or other material of a sexual nature. Id. at 1500-01.
165. See, e.g., Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 780-81 (10th Cir.
1995) (listing sexually explicit notes as among the types of sexual harassment the employee was
forced to endure). This category includes, but is not limited to, sexually suggestive body
movements, gestures, looks, or stares at particular parts of another student's body, notes, letters,
or other written communication. Id at 780.
166. See HoSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that public school students, grades 8
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such as verbal and physical abuse,'67 inappropriate touching or
kissing, I"e multiple violent and life threatening comments, threats of
violence, ogling, and obscene language with sexual overtones,'
assault, rape (including gang rape),17 and repeated sexually
derogatory comments.
The OCR Guidance describes two types of hostile conduct or
behavior that constitute prohibited Title IX sex discrimination: (1)
quid pro quo sexual harassment that conditions a student's
participation in an education program or activity on sexual favors,
72
and (2) sexual harassment that is so severe or pervasive that it creates
a "hostile" or "offensive" educational environment.7 3 As described
below, there are sufficient facts for Naomi to allege that James'
conduct resulted in both quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment.
a. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Quid pro-quo sexual harassment occurs when a school employee
explicitly or implicitly conditions a student's participation in an
education program or activity, or bases an educational decision, on
the student's submission to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
through 11 experienced hostile educational sexual harassment of (1) being subjected to sexual
comments, jokes, gestures, or looks (66%), (2) being touched, grabbed and/or pinched in a
sexual way (53%), (3) intentionally brushed up against in a sexual way (46%), (4) being flashed
or mooned (45%), and (5) having sexual rumors spread about them).
167. See generally Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997-
98 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (alleging the harassment of a ten year old by two eleven year olds to
include assault, attempted rape, and verbal abuse). The harassment included attempted rape,
assault, fondling, and verbal abuse on multiple occasions. Id. at 995-96.
168. See generally Oona v. Mcaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that the
teacher fondled, kissed, and straddled the student).
169. See Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 899 (D. Minn. 1999) (stating
that the alleged sexual harassment included ogling and threats of violence).
170. SeegenerallyBrzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 952-53 (4th Cir. 1997)
(noting victim's allegation of gang rape by two members of the football team was motivated by
their discriminatory animus toward women); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 475-76 (D.R.I.
1999) (finding that rape and other features of the incident indicate that it was gender
motivated).
171. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 903-04 (1st Cir. 1988) (describing the
sexual instances that the female medical student was subjected to daily).
172. See generally EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, (last modified
Mar. 19, 1990 <http://ww.eeoc.gov/docs/currentissues.html> [hereinafter EEOC Guidance
on Sexual Harassment] (outlining the EEOC's sexual harassment policy).
173. See generally EEOC Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 172. Although "quid
pro quo" and "hostile environment claims are conceptually distinct, the factual differences are
often blurred, and they may occur together. For example, a teacher who makes sexual
advances to a student may also threaten retaliation if the student complains about the
behavior." Id.
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nature.!74 This type of sexual harassment typically occurs when a
school employee with authority over the student, such as a teacher or
administrator, conditions educational benefits on sexual favors.175
One example is when a teacher explicitly offers to change a grade if
the student submits to his or her sexual demands. 176
This type of unlawful sexual harassment also covers situations in
which the student resists or refuses the school employee's sexual
demands and suffers threatened harm, and where the student
submits and avoids the threatened harm.7  When viewed in their
entirety, Naomi's allegations regarding James' repeated requests to
"date," his heightened scrutiny of her research work, his physical
threats, and his veiled comment regarding her seminar grade are
certainly sufficient to place the University on notice regarding a
potential quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. 78
In most quid pro quo cases, the "unwelcome" sexual conduct will
not be at issue because of the disparity in age and power between the
student and the harassing school employee. 79 For these students,
their failure to complain or their "participation" in a sexual
relationship will not preclude a finding that the alleged harassment
174. See generally Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (defining quid pro quo
sexual harassment).
175. See, e.g., Canurillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1996)
(articulating the application of quid pro quo sexual harassment in the educational setting).
176. See Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 921 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding
there tas sufficient evidence to raise a jury question regarding whether a track coach's
comments to a female track team member constituted a sexual advance); see also Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264, 1275-78 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (claiming that
students saw test answers in return for allowing a teacher to sexually abuse them); Alexander v.
Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), af'd, 631 F. 2d 178, 182 (2nd Cir. 1980) (finding
that the student's academic achievement was conditioned on submission to a teacher's sexual
demands); Kadicki v. Virginia Commonwealth Sch., 892 F. Supp. 746, 778 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(finding that a course reexamination was conditioned on a college student's agreement to be
spanked if she did not attain a certain grade).
177. See generally OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,038 (stating that quid pro quo sexual
harassment is equally illegal whether the student submits or resists).
178. 1& WhetherJames' conduct rises to the level of actionable quid pro quo harassment is
a determination for the University to make after an appropriate fact-finding investigation.
179. See Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226 (7th Cir.
1997) (concluding that unwelcomeness is not a proper inquiry in Tite IX cases involving sexual
discrimination of elementary school children); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.
Supp. 1288, 1296-97 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (creating an assumption that a reasonable student
exposed to sexual harassment will be fearful of the school employee due to age difference and
perception of power). But see Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1358 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (suggesting that unwelcomeness is a factual issue in dispute in the case of a high
school student who was sexually involved with his teacher); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist., 838
F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (noting that no party disputed that an eight-grade
student was "willingly" involved with her coach in a sexual relationship, and his advances were
not unwelcome).
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was "unwelcome."'80
Given Naomi's maturity, the issue of whether James' conduct was
"welcome" is fact-specific, and will be addressed as part of the
University's fact-finding investigation.
b. Hostile Educational Environment
"Hostile educational environment" sexual harassment includes
unwelcome sexual advances, sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.'
Naomi must show, by credible evidence, that James sexually harassed
her, and that the sexual harassment was so pervasive or severe that it
rose to the level of prohibited sex discrimination.1
2
To satisfy this element, Naomi must establish that the sexual
conduct or behavior was unwelcome, limited her ability to participate
in or benefit from an education program or activity, or created a
hostile or abusive educational environment."' Naomi must also show
that the unwelcome conduct created an objectively hostile or abusive
educational environment, and that she subjectively believed the
educational environment was hostile or abusive.
8 4
In Gebser' 5 and Davis,"6 the Supreme Court declined to apply Tide
VII's vicarious liability standard to Tide IX cases. Federal courts have
referred to prior Title VII decisions for guidance regarding the
180. See generally Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (finding that voluntary
submission to sexual conduct will not automatically defeat a Title VII claim since the correct
inquiry is whether the employee indicated that the sexual conduct was unwelcome); cf. EEOC
Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 172, at 4-5 (defining unvelcome sexual
conduct). See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,040 (stating that the OCR will not treat sexual
conduct between a school employee and an elementary school student as consensual). In cases
involving secondary students, the OCR will find a strong presumption that the sexual conduct
was not consensual. In cases involving older secondary students and post-secondary students,
the OCR will consider a number of factors including: (1) the nature of the sexual conduct and
the relationship of the school employee to the student, i.e., the employee's degree of influence,
authority, or control over the student, (2) whether the student was legally or practically unable
to consent to the sexual conduct at issue, and (3) the student's age, or disability. Id. at 12,040.
181. See generally Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1999) (suggesting that the
acts of the teacher and his continued presence in class could create a hostile educational
environment).
182. SeeDavisv. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1675-76 (1999) (detailing the
standards to prove hostile educational environment).
183. See OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,038 (noting the requirement to establish certain
elements).
184. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (stating that under Vinson,
there must be a showing of an objectively hostile environment and the victim must have a
subjective belief that a hostile environment exists).
185. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998) (declining to
apply vicarious liability to a sexual discrimination suit).
186. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675 (holding that funding recipients are held properly liable
only when they have actual knowledge of the sexual harassment).
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appropriate standard for determining whether sex-based conduct
constitutes unlawful harassment under Tide IX. s7 Citing Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Ina,'ss the Supreme Court held that
evaluating whether sex based conduct rises to the level of actionable
Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment "depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships." 9 These factors include the sex and ages of the
harasser and the victim;19 the identity and relationship between the
alleged harasser and the victim; 91 the degree to which the conduct
affected one or more student's education;9 2 the size of the school,
the location of the incidents, the number of individuals involved, and
the context in which the incidents occurred;9' the type, frequency,
and duration of the conduct;'94 and evidence showing the existence of
187. See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-87 (detailing aspects of Title VII and Title IX).
Under Title VII, the harassing conduct must be so pervasive or severe that a reasonable person
would find it hostile or abusive. See generally Menitor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-70
(1986) (defining harassing conduct under Title VII). It must create an objectively hostile or
abusive environment, and the plaintiff must subjectively believe the work environment is hostile
or abusive. See generally New York Urban League, Inc., v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir.
1995) (applying Title VII standards to other similar claims); Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819,
828-29, n.12 (7th Cir. 1995) (detailing the relationship between Titles VII and VI); Elston v.
Tallodega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993) (equating the standards of
Title VII to apply to Title VI); see also Han-is, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (requiring a showing of more
then mere unwelcomeness).
188. 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
189. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1675 (1999).
190. See generally Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226-27
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that age difference between a harasser and victim creates an assumption
of reasonable fear of reprisal if the victim does not submit to the harasser's demands).
191. SeeDavis, 119 S. Ct. at 1672 (holding that the identity of the harasser is relevant).
192. See, e.g., Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th cir. 1999) (stating that
the student left school, engaged in self-destructive and suicidal behavior, and entered a
psychiatric hospital); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 753 (2nd Cir.
1998) (noting that the student withdrew from school and transferred after the board of
education refused to allow a transfer to another class); Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 475
(9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that the student left school and began home schooling); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that after the incident the
student stopped attending classes, attempted suicide, and sought aid of the school psychiatrist),
reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 11
(1999); Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that
the student left school); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991,
996 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (concluding the effect of the harassment was that the student missed
many school days, received lower grades, and developed an inability to complete required
course work).
193. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671 (holding that the context of harrasment must be within the
control of the school board to hold them liable under Title IX).
194. See id. at 1672-73 (applying the factors to the facts). Compare Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst.
of Tech., 191 F.3d 455, 1999 WL 528169, *1 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim since the two instances at issue were not pervasive or offensive, did not result in a
denial of educational benefits, and the instances ended as soon as they had begun), with
Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 959 (citing Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1011 (1995), opinion vacated, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The court held that
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other gender-based, non-sexual harassment, including race or
ethnicity based comments directed at the student. 9'
The EEOC guidelines are consistent with the Harris factors. The
EEOC's policy identifies the following factors for determining
whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive: (1) whether
the conduct was verbal or physical, or both; (2) how frequently the
conduct was repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile and
patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a coworker or
supervisor; (5) whether other individuals joined in perpetrating the
harassment; and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more
than one individual.96
While there is no bright line between unwelcome harassment and
merely unpleasant conduct, simple teasing, off hand comments, and
isolated comments (unless severe or egregious) will not generally rise
to the level of prohibited Title IX hostile environment sexual
harassment.1 97 In this case, however, James' conduct goes well beyond
being "merely unpleasant." Naomi's allegations generally describe
the type and frequency of sex-based conduct that is sufficient to show
a hostile environment.
98
3. The Unwelcome Sexual Conduct Was So Severe, Pervasive, and
Objectively Offensive That It Denied Naomi. Equal Access To The
University's Educational Opportunities Or Benefits
To satisfy this element in a hostile environment claim, Naomi must
show that James' conduct had a specific, identifiable, negative affect
on her ability to receive an appropriate education.'" Naomi must
also show how the sexual harassment affected her, and establish that
the alleged sexual harassment reached a "wide spread" level.00
Specifically, Naomi must allege and prove thatJames' conduct was so
severe, persistent, and objectively pervasive that it limited her ability
"rape is 'not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature'
that is 'plainly sufficient to state a claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment." Id.
195. See generallyJefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-35
(5th Cir. 1980) (finding race and gender based discrimination as relevant to a determination
under Title VII).
196. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 172.
197. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675 (concluding that off hand comments and teasing usually
found in school where children have yet to develop social skills as not rising to the level of Tite
IX discrimination).
198. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61-69, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404-07 (1986)
(discussing the meaning of a hostile environment).
199. See generally Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675-76 (requiring a demonstration of specific and
identifiable negative effects on the victim's ability to receive an appropriate education).
200. See id. at 1675 (providing an example of overt student-on-student sexual harassment).
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to participate in or benefit from a University education program or




In Davis, the Supreme Court held that sexual harassment covered
by Title IX must be so "serious" and "persistent" that it has the
systemic effect of denying a student equal access to a school's
educational program or activity.2 2 In a student-on-student case, this
requirement reconciles the school's responsibility to remedy known
sexual harassment with the "practical realities of responding to
student behavior."
2 0 3
A single advance in a quid pro quo case will generally be sufficient
to establish prohibited Tide IX sexual harassment.2°4 A student can
satisfy this element by showing the school employee, usually a
teacher, explicitly or implicitly conditioned the student's
participation in an education program or activity on his or her
submission to sexual advances or requests for sexual favors.
If the student alleges hostile environment sexual harassment, an
isolated incident is generally insufficient under Title IX, unless it is
peculiarly egregious or severe. Sensitive to reminders that
"children may regularly interact in a manner that would be
unacceptable among adults," the Supreme Court held that "damages
are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among
school children, . . . even where these comments target differences in
201. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
that a Title IX complaint alleging a violation of the 14th Amendment must prove that the
conduct complained of deprived the student of rights, privileges , and immunities); Brzonkala
v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (1997) (describing in graphic detail the gang
rape of a freshman by two members of the university football team), reh'gen bancgranted, opinion
vacated, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1998); Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp 2d 911, 915
(S.D. Ohio 1998) (detailing the standard of hostile educational environment under Title IX).
202. 119 S. Ct. at 1675.
203. Id.
204. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 172, at *8 (concluding
that a single instance of harassment can be enough to establish a Title IX violation). See
generally Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-66 (1998) (holding that a
supervisor's threats that were not accompanied by tangible employment action may be
actionable sexual harassment under Title VII).
205. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a "student suffers extraordinary harm when
subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher, and that the teacher's conduct is
reprehensible and undermines the basic purposes of the educational system." Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (1998).
206. See, e.g., Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 918-19 (D. Minn. 1999)
(concluding that plaintiff's allegations of daily offensive sexual comments, physical threats of a
sexual nature, life-threatening behaviors, obscenity directed toward her and other female
students, sexual gestures, and offensive physical contacts were adequate to state a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim); Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911,916
(S.D. Ohio 1998) (finding that limited and isolated sexual requests, when viewed against the
long standing friendly relationship, did not create a hostile educational environment).
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gender."2 °7
The Supreme Court distinguished teacher-on-student harassment
from peer harassment in hostile environment sexual harassment
cases."' The Supreme Court's difference in treatment is based, in
part, on its observation that;
the relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily
affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said to breach
Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits and to
have a systemic effect on a program or activity. Peer harassment, in
particular, is less likely to satisfy these requirements than is teacher-
student harassment.Z
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a single instance of
"sufficiently severe" student-on-student sexual harassment will not
generally satisfy Title IX's requirement of a "systemic effect."2"0
Like the employment context, there is little dispute about the
substantial negative effect of sexual harassment on harassed students,
including tangible or obvious physical injuries, and emotional or
psychological distress.211 To satisfy this element, Naomi must show,
however, more than just the negative impact James' conduct had on
her. She must allege and prove that the persistence and severity of
James' unwelcome conduct resulted in the systemic effect of denying
her equal access to a University educational program or activity. 2,2 In
this case, it is likely that Naomi's allegations about the manifestations
of her emotional and physical discomfort will meet this element;
specifically, her sleeplessness, anxiety, lapses in concentration,
207. Davis, 119 S. CL at 1676.
208. See id (stating that it is relevant who is the harasser).
209. Id
210. See id. (stating that this heavier burden for student-on-student harassment is significant
since the overwhelming majority of cases are based on peer harassment); see also HOSTILE
HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 10-11 (reporting that 79% of the respondents reported that they
were harassed by current or former students, while 18% reported that they were harassed by a
school employee).
211. The AAUW findings reported that sexual harassment has a significant educational,
emotional, and behavioral impact on the students who reported that they were harassed.
Nearly 23% of the students who were sexually harassed stated that they did not want to attend
school, nor talk as much in class. 21% reported that it was harder to pay attention in school,
and 13% reported a lower grade in class. 12% of these students thought about changing
schools, while 3% actually changed schools because of the sexual harassment. These sexually
harassed students also described the emotional impact of sexual harassment as follows: 50%
were embarrassed, 37% felt self-conscious, 29% felt less sure of themselves, and 21% felt afraid
or scared. Regarding the behavioral consequences of harassment, 49% of the respondents
stated that they tried to avoid the harasser, 23% stayed away from particular places in the school
or on the school grounds, 22% changed their seats in class, and 12% stopped attending a
particular activity or sport. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 15-17.
212. SeeDavis, 119 S. CL at 1676 (declining to hold a mere decline in grades enough proof
to survive a Motion to Dismiss).
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apprehension about her personal safety, and concerns about a lower
evaluation of her research and classroom work.
4. An Appropriate University Official Had Actual Notice OfJames'
Alleged Sexual Harassment
To satisfy Title IX's underlying Spending Clause limitation, Naomi
must allege and prove that an "appropriate [University] person" had
notice of James' alleged sexual harassment, and that the University
had an opportunity to "rectify any violation."2 1 3  An "appropriate
person" is, at a minimum, "an official... with authority to take
corrective action to end the discrimination" on the University's
behalf.214 Naomi must show therefore, that a University "official with
authority to address James' alleged sexual harassment and to institute
corrective measures on the [University's behalf] had actual
knowledge of the discrimination," and failed adequately to
respond.21"5 This is a significant barrier for Naomi and many Title IX
216plaintiffs, especially younger, less mature students, to overcome.
a. The Notice Must Alert the University to James' Alleged
Harassment
The first part of this element requires Naomi to show that a
University official had actual notice or knowledge of James'
unwelcome sexual conduct.2 7 The Supreme Court did not describe
213. Id. at 1673. Compare Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 278 (1998)
(holding that to allow recovery on a constructive notice standard would frustrate the purpose of
Title IX), and Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 960-61 (1997) (concluding
that Virginia Tech was liable for students' sexual assault (rape) since it knew or should have
known of the illegal conduct, and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action), reh'gen
bancgranted, opinion vacated, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1998), with OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at
12,042 (holding that an educational institution had constructive notice of the alleged
harassment if it "should have known" about the harassment through a "reasonably diligent
inquiry").
214. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1673 (1999).
215. Id.
216. Id. For younger students, satisfying this element may be difficult given their general
reluctance to report sexual harassment allegations to adults, including teachers. Only 7% of
sexually harassed students reported that they told a teacher about their experience, while 23%
reported that they told a parent or other family member. In contrast, 63% of sexually harassed
students told a friend about their experience. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 14.
217. See Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908-09 (D. Minn. 1999)
(asserting that school designated Title IX coordinator, who personally witnessed several of the
alleged sexual harassing incidents, could properly be viewed as being in a position of authority
since they could be characterized as responsible for receiving complaints under the district's
sexual harassment conduct policy manual); Wooden v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. Of
Ga., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (noting that the university president had
knowledge of the alleged discriminatory admission policy and possessed the power to eliminate
the policy); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995-96 (M.D.
Tenn. 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff had raised enough facts to sustain a Title IX claim);
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the precise nature or specificity of the information that is sufficient to
establish the requisite official "notice.""" It is clear, however, that
Naomi must prove, at a minimum, that she provided the University
with sufficient detail to "alert" it to the possibility that "prohibited
discrimination or harassment, is occurring, or has taken place in the
context subject to the institution's control.""9
Since Tide IX liability is based on actual notice principles, there
are at least two hurdles Naomi must overcome to establish the
requisite notice.2 2 0  First, Naomi is precluded from establishing the
University's notice by simply proving James' knowledge of his own
offensive conduct or wrongdoing!"2  Second, Naomi's general
assertion of a social or a sexual relationship between her and James
may also be insufficient to establish "actual notice" of improper
conduct or harassment.22 This means that Chairman Tyson's
knowledge of their relationship, including his one-time observation
of James' conduct, is inadequate, if there is no evidence that
Chairman Tyson knew or had reason to believe that their relationship
was "anything but mutually consensual."2 23  Naomi's reliance on
Chairman Tyson to establish the University's notice will be misplaced
Carroll v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (finding that
evidence existed that a school district official had knowledge of the sexual harassment). But see
X v. Freemont County Sch. Dist., 162 F.3d 1175, No. 96-8065, 1998 WL 704692, at *2-3 (10th
Cir. Oct. 2, 1998) (noting that the record was devoid of any evidence that a school official knew
of the alleged harassing incidents when they occurred, nor that they knew of any other alleged
harassment involving the same teacher); Davis v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 996 F. Supp. 1478,
1482-83 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding no Tide IX liability since the school board was entirely
unaware of the fact that three students were sexually molested).
218. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289, 118 S. CL 1989, 1999
(1998). The dissent in Gebser opined that the majority's new rule potentially undermined the
very purpose for imposing liability on schools: "to induce school boards to adopt and enforce
practices that will minimize the danger that vulnerable students will be exposed to ... odious
behavior." The dissent warned that "school boards [will be able to] insulate themselves from
knowledge about [sexually harassing] conduct... [and] claim immunity from damages
liability." Id They were concerned about a scenario where "every teacher at [a] school [knows]
about the harassment but [does] not have authority to institute corrective measures on the
district's behalf." Id. at 301 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 291 (holding that the principal could not have known of the sexual
harassment since comments by students were simply insufficient to put the principal on notice
of a problem); see also Morlock, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (inferring that the individual in charge had
personal knowledge of the sexual harassment at issue).
220. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92 (discussing the notice requirements).
221. See id. at 280 (citing the RESTATEmENT OF AGENCY § 280 for the proposition that the
school district was not responsible for the teacher's harassment because no other district official
had actual knowledge of his prohibited behavior). But see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
119 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1999) (finding that the record showed no factual dispute regarding the
school board's knowledge of the sexual harassment).
222. See Liu v. Struili, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.RI. 1999) (noting that the Gebser court
required actual notice to hold a school district liable under Tide IX).
223. I. at 465.
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unless Noami alleges that she told him that her relationship with
224James was abusive or coercive.
b. The University Official With Notice Must Have Authority To
Take Corrective Action
If Naomi establishes that a University official has sufficient actual
notice,"5 she must also show that the official is "an appropriate
person," one who has "authority" to take corrective action on the
school's behalf and received actual notice. 26 This requirement is
based on the principle that the University is liable under Title IX only
where it can exercise substantial control over the harasser and the
context in which the known harassment occurs.2 2 ' Naomi can
generally meet this element by first alleging that James' harassment
or misconduct occurred during "school hours" and/or on "school
grounds." Specifically, Naomi can show thatJames' misconduct took
place under an activity or operation of the University or otherwise
under the University's supervision.28
Naomi can satisfy this notice requirement by showing that she used
the University's harassment or grievance policy, provided it
adequately described or designated certain individuals to whom
complaints must be made, such as a "Title IX Coordinator."229 Once
224. See id at 465-66 (noting that petitioner did not establish that school officials knew that
the relationship was anything but consenual).
225. See X v. Freemont County Sch. Dist., No. 96-8065, 1998 WL 704692, at *3 (10th Cir.
Oct. 2, 1998) (Lucero, J., concurring) (asserting that actual notice standard does not account
for extreme youth). Judge Lucero opines that "... one result of Gebser, contrary to its
expressed intent, will be to limit protection of very young students against teacher harassment"
since they are: (1) inexperienced at discerning what conduct is appropriate or inappropriate,
(2) taught to respect their teachers, (3) not likely or well-equipped to report misconduct by
their teachers. i.
226. Id. The OCR Guidance states that an employee will be considered to have received
"actual notice" on behalf of a school if the employee is, in fact, an agent or a responsible school
employee, or if it is reasonable for the student to believe that the employee is a responsible
school employee. The reasonableness of the student's belief depends on factors such as the
authority that is actually given to the employee, and the age of the student. This general rule
can apply to such employees as janitors or cafeteria workers if it would be reasonable for the
student-victim to believe the employees are in positions of authority in relation to the student.
OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,039. OCR considers the fact that some young students may
reasonably believe that an adult, such as a teacher or a school nurse, is an individual they can
tell about incidents of sexual harassment regardless of that individual's formal status in the
school administration. Id. at 12,037.
227. Id. at 12,042.
228. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1669 (1999) (noting that
Titie IX prohibits discrimination in the programs and activities of a federally funded
educational institution). This should not be difficult since the evidence shows that students are
being sexually harassed on school grounds and in school activities: school hallways (66%),
classrooms (55%), on school grounds (43%), on school transportation (26%), or at a field trip
(24%). HosTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 4, at 12-13.
229. See Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908-09 (D. Minn. 1999)
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the University designates a specific individual to receive "notice" of
harassment, actual knowledge will be imputed to it if Naomi gave
notice, in fact, to such individua
230
Naomi can also satisfy the notice requirement by showing that she
gave notice to other University officials who have apparent or implied
authority to take appropriate, corrective action.13  This notice will be
adequate even though these officials are not specifically identified by
the University as the proper parties to receive a grievance or
complaint. 232 This is a fact-based inquiry and is not solely dependent
on job tifles and organizational structure.233
(finding that the school's policy manual required grievances to be filed with a Title IX
coordinator who was required to forward that information to the building principal and that
the Title IX coordinator at issue had actual notice of the alleged student misconduct); Burtner
v. Hiram College, 9 F. Supp. 2d 852, 856 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (concluding that the school's
director of career services and Tide IX grievance officer did not meet the Gebserstandard for an
appropriate person).
230. DOE regulations require a school to designate at least one employee to coordinate its
efforts to comply with and carry out its Title IX responsibilities. A school must also notify all of
its students and employees of the name, office address, and telephone number of the employee
or employees. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a). See also
Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 1998) (describing a Title VII case).
231. See generally Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289-92, 118 S. Ct. 1989,
1999-2000 (1998) (detailing the notice requirement).
232. See Morlock, 46 F. Supp. 2d 899, 910 (D.Minn. 1999) (stating that two teachers were
appropriate persons for plaintiff's allegations of student misconduct because they had
immediate responsibility over student discipline in their classrooms); Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d
1264, 1264 (l1th Cir. 1999) (holding that there was no notice because the two individuals
identified by plaintiff were not school district officials, and lacked authority to end the alleged
discrimination); Miller v. Kentosh, NO. Civ. A. 97-6541, 1998 WL 355520, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June
29, 1998) (the high school's band leader and another teacher did not have authority to take
corrective action against a music teacher who had a sexual relationship with plaintiff);
Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 97 C 8507, 1998 WL 601822 at *3-*4 (N.D. I1. 1998)
(deciding that the Director of a Master's Degree Program in Public Administration (MPA) was
an appropriate person to receive a complaint from plaintiff, a MPA candidate, about an
unwelcome touching by a fellow student. Plaintiff did not report this incident to the
administrators designated by LIT to receive and investigate harassment complaints); Canutillo
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lejia, 101 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the school district was
not liable under Tide IX harassment for a teacher's harassment of a student where the plaintiff
only gave notice of the harassment to another teacher).
233. SeegenerallyMurrellv. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1243-52 (10th Cir.
1999) (stating that the critical question is whether the school official exercises substantial
authority to "halt known abuse, perhaps by measures such as transferring the harassing student,
suspending him, curtailing his privileges, or providing additional supervision"). Id. Whether
such individuals are "appropriate persons" depends on the context in which the harassment
allegations arise, the identity of the harasser, the identity of the victim, and the institution's
organizational structure. For example, an elementary or middle school student may be able to
raise allegations of student-to-student harassment to his or her teacher, a principal, a guidance
counselor, or an assistant principal, where each individual has responsibility over student
discipline in the classroom. Id at 1248. See also Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist. & S.
Kortright Sch. Bd., 163 F.3d 749, 760 (2d Cir. 1998) (deciding that plalntiffs "Title IX claim did
not fall for a lack of actual notice" since several school officials were aware of her sexual
harassment allegations). The Second Circuit also found that her classroom teacher's "personal
observations alone are sufficient to establish actual notice." Id.
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Since this is a case of alleged teacher harassment, Naomi must
show that the University official with actual notice had authority to
"police" relationships between faculty and students, or had authority
to discipline James for his improper conduct or behavior.34 It is
important to recognize, however, that the mere fact that a University
official has a duty under its sexual harassment policy to report
potential improper sexual conduct to the appropriate University
authority may not be sufficient to invoke Title IX liability. The duty
to report such information may not establish the requisite authority
to take corrective action because a report, by itself, will not end the
alleged discrimination.2 5
In Title VII harassment cases, there are limited circumstances in
which a plaintiff's failure to complain to an employer or otherwise
provide notice of alleged harassment is excused and will not preclude
liability. '36  These include cases where the plaintiff has reason to
believe that: (1) using the organization's complaint process or
procedures, or complaining to management, will result in retaliation;
(2) the organization's policy includes undue expense, has
inaccessible contacts for making a complaint, or other burdensome
administrative requirements; (3) the complaint process is ineffective
- such as requiring the plaintiff to first complain to the harassing
supervisor. 237 Neither Gebser nor Davis specifically addressed whether
a Tite IX plaintiff can raise similar defenses to justify his or her
failure to provide notice to the appropriate school official. It seems
unlikely, however, that such defenses will be available in Title IX
cases given the Supreme Court's analysis of the Spending Clause
limitation, and its actual notice requirement."
234. See Morse & Handley v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir.
1998) (asserting that in order to maintain a Title IX claim, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege
that the University's officials had the "authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the [University's] behalf") (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)). Federal regulations indicate that the ROTC
Commandant is responsible to the University "for conducting the ROTC program in
accordance with institutional rules, regulations, and customs." Id. at 1128 n.1. In addition, the
University President "exercise[d] the same control over the department of military science" as
over any other department in the University). Id.
235.Liu v. Striuli and Providence College, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 466 (D.R.I. 1999).
236. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (noting that if the bank's
complaint procedures might have insulated it from liability if they "were better calculated to
encourage victims of [Title VII] harassment to come forward.").
237. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: icarious Emploer Liability for Unlawful Harassment By
Supervisors (June 18, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/harrassment.html>.
238. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1620 (1999) (citing Franklin
Guinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (asserting that schools administering
programs based on the authority of Congress to grant funds pursuant to the Spending Clause,
must be put on notice that they may be liable for Title IX monetary damages before such
charges may be brought).
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5. Did the University Act With "Deliberate Indifference" to Naomi's
Sexual Harassment Allegations?
The University incurs Title IX liability only if its "deliberate
indifference" subjected Naomi to prohibited sexual harassment and it
had the "authority to take remedial action."' 9 At a minimum, Naomi
must show that the University's "deliberate indifference" caused her
to undergo "harassment" or made her vulnerable to it in one of its
programs or activities.24°
Assuming Naomi can establish that James' conduct constituted
prohibited sexual harassment, she must then show that the University
was "deliberately indifferent" to James' conduct, i.e., by showing that
the University's response (or lack thereof) was "clearly
unreasonable.""' While the Supreme Court did not provide specific
examples of a "clearly unreasonable" response that would warrant a
finding of "deliberate indifference," it set forth several overarching




Title IX liability presupposes that the University official who has
actual knowledge of a potential Title IX violation fails or refuses to
take action to bring the school into compliance. This means that
Naomi's underlying burden is to establish that the University made
an "official decision ... not to remedy the harassment.
'
,211
The "deliberate indifference" standard does not mandate that the
University satisfy a threshold standard for its corrective or remedial
actions to avoid Title IX liability. While Naomi may recommend or
insist on implementation of specific corrective measures to
"remedy... the harassment," or "ensure that.., students conform
their conduct to certain rules," the University is not required to adopt
them. " Courts should defer to the University's corrective actions and
"refrain from second guessing the disciplinary decisions made by
239. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1672 (1999).
240. Id ("The scope of prohibited conduct [is] based on the recipient's degree of control
over the harasser and the environment in which the harassment occurs.").
241. Id. at 1674.
242. I& (maintaining that "[t]his is not a mere 'reasonableness' standard .... In an
appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for a summary
judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a response as not 'clearly unreasonable'
as a matter of law").
243. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,290-91 (1998).
244. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1674.
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school administrators."245  To establish liability, the critical showing
for Naomi is whether the University responded to her harassment
allegations in a manner that is "clearly unreasonable. 2 46
The reasonableness of the University's actions depends on the
totality of the factual circumstances underlying Naomi's sexual
harassment allegations, and may include an analysis of the
247University's control over James. The University's corrective
response can be flexible, and chosen from a range of alternatives. It
will depend, in part, on the "level of disciplinary authority available to
the [University], and the potential liability arising from certain forms
of disciplinary action."2 4 Accordingly, University officials will have
reasonable discretion to choose from a range of responses, provided
that the strategy they choose is calculated to end James' harassment,
and prevent it from reoccurring.249
245. Id. at 1674 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-343 (1985)); see also
Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 919-20 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the
university did not discriminate because it "respond[ed] with good-faith remedial action" upon
notice of the plaintiff's complaint, and no harassment was reported after such action); Wills v.
Brown Univ. 184 F.3d 20, 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining the dissent opined that an educational
institution need not
terminate [a] teacher's employment in order to avoid Title IX liability.... The
adequacy of the institution's response... will depend on a myriad of factors relating
to the nature of the harassment, its duration, the roles of the harasser and the victim
before and after the harassment, the nature of their continuing contact, other acts of
misconduct by the harasser known to the institution, and the conditions altered by the
continuing presence of the harasser.
246. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1674.
247. See, e.g., Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 909 (D. Minn. 1999)
(explaining that the defendants argued that they were limited in their ability to
discipline/expel some of the students whose misconduct toward the plaintiff related to a
disability with which they were classified). The Davis Court observed "that the nature of [the
State's] power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults." Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1673
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
OCR policy will consider the level of control that a school has over the harasser in
determining the reasonableness of the school's response to the allegations. OCR Guidance,
supra note 2, at 12,043. In certain circumstances, OCR policy requires the school to take steps
to remedy the effects of the harassment on the student who was harassed. OCR Guidance, supra
note 2, at 12,042. A list of such arrangements included a change of grade, providing tutoring,
and reimbursement for professional counseling. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12,043. See
University of California at Santa Cruz, OCR Case No. 09-93-2141, (requiring extensive
individual and group counseling); Eden Prairie Schools, District #272, OCR Case No. 05-92-
1174, (explaining that OCR ordered counseling).
248. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1674. The Supreme Court observed that a university may not be
able "to exercise the same degree of control over its students that a grade school would
enjoy... and would be entirely reasonable for a school to refrain from a form of disciplinary
action that would expose it to constitutional or statutory claims." Id.
249. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that school
officials can avoid Title IX liability if they aggressively investigate all sexual harassment
complaints and respond "consistently and meaningfully" when they find that a complaint has
merit); Stacy v. Shoney's Inc., 955 F. Supp. 751, 756 (E.D. Ky. 1997) ("Effectiveness is measured
not by the extent to which the employer disciplines or punishes the alleged harasser, but rather
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The University's failure to promulgate and disseminate a current
policy and grievance procedure for sexual harassment claims will not
establish the requisite "deliberate indifference." Although the DOE
Guidelines require each covered school to "adopt and publish
grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution
of student/employee complaints,""' the Supreme Court has held that
a school's failure to promulgate a grievance procedure does not
constitute Tide IX discrimination, by itself.25
The Supreme Court did not resolve the question of whether a
school's promulgation of an effective sexual harassment policy
22
could be raised as an affirmative defense to liability. In Gebser, the
dissent led by justice Ginsburg (joined by justices Souter and Breyer)
would recognize a school's promulgation and publication of an
effective policy for reporting and redressing sexual harassment as an
affirmative defensefs The effectiveness of the policy will depend on
how and when it is communicated, how it is used, and the students'
experiences when using the policy.
This approach would be similar to that used in Title VII cases
the steps taken by the defendant halt the harassment.") (citing Bouton v. BMW of N. Am, Inc.,
29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994); Wlls, 184 F.3d at 27 (stating that the teacher-harasser's mere
presence on the campus was not sufficient to show harassment and a "reasonably firm"
reprimand for the teacher did not represent "deliberate indifference").
250. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1999).
251. The Supreme Court stated that the Department of Education has "authority to
promulgate and enforce requirements that effectuate [Title IX's] non-discrimination mandate,
(citation omitted) even if those requirements do not purport to represent a definition of
discrimination under the statute." Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292
(1998). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the DOE could enforce its requirements
administratively, but declined to imply a private cause of action to allow recovery for violation of
administrative requirements. 1i; see also Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (the institution's failure "to promulgate a grievance procedure for dealing with
discrimination does not necessarily imply its knowledge of any given instance of
discrimination").
252. See Office of Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Student's by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12044-12045 (1997)
(asserting that an effective policy should indude the following elements: (1) a sexual
harassment definition, including examples; (2) a clear and understandable statement of the
organization's commitment to a harassment free school; (3) a clear and complete description
of the procedures, including the availability of an investigation, the time frames and each step;
(4) assurances regarding confidentiality of the student, and cooperating witnesses; (5)
assurances of no retaliation against the student, and any witnesses; (6) a statement regarding
discipline or other sanctions for sexual harassment; and (7) a clear description of the student's
rights and responsibilities, and the school's obligations. It must also be routinely and regularly
communicated to all employees, and updated, where necessary. Id. at 12043.
253. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 307.
254. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1401-402 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Burtner v. Hiram College, 9 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding no deliberate
indifference because the student did not establish the requisite school notice where she was "a
more mature college student and the defendant school did have a sexual harassment policy and
grievance procedure"). Id.
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involving supervisory sexual harassment of a subordinate employee.5,5
In such cases, the employer can avoid Title VII liability or limit
damages by establishing an affirmative defense that includes two
necessary elements: (a) the "employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) ... [the] employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. ' ' 6
b. Evaluating the Adequacy of the School's Response
Although the Supreme Court provided little guidance regarding
the factors it will consider to evaluate the "adequacy" or
"reasonableness" of a school's corrective action, several lower court
decisions have established certain minimal standards. 7
Once the University learns of Naomi's sexual harassment
allegations, it must conduct a timely, thorough, and fair
investigation. 25'  The University has a duty to investigate even if
Naomi does not make a formal complaint, or otherwise ask the
University not to take any action.25' The clearest indicator of
"deliberate indifference" would occur if the University failed to
conduct a minimal investigation, given these allegations.26
Although there are no fixed time lines, the University must
conduct and complete its investigation in a prompt and reasonable
time period from the date it learns of the harassment. The precise
time lines depend on the nature and complexity of the allegations,
and the workload of the investigator.2 61  Depending on the
255. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998) (suggesting that the
mere existence of a sexual harassment policy would foreclose liability on the part of the
school).
256. 1& at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 542 U.S. 775, 777-78 (1998). See generally
EEOC Guidance On Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, supra note
237 at :::8
257 See, e.g., Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that to hold a school board liable under Tide IX, a person with power to take
corrective action must have notice of the alleged harassment); Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d
20, 34 (1st Cir. 1999) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing assessment of action taken by university
against the harasser and whether the harassment stopped in response as constituting relevant
factors in satisfying the adequate response inquiry of Tide IX claim). See generally West v. Derby
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, No. 98-3247, 2000 WL 294093, at *7 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2000)
(finding school district's anti-discrimination policy reasonable).
258. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12043.
259. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12042.
260. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12042 - 12043.
261. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 761 (2nd Cir. 1998)
(assessing that "the appropriateness of the corrective measures taken" by school officials
"incorporate [s] the issue of timeliness."); Frye v. Board. of Educ. of the County of Ohio, No. 98-
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circumstances, the University may be required to take interim
measures while the investigation is underway, such as allowing Naomi
to voluntarily transfer to a different class for the remainder of the
semester, or reassigning her research duties to another professor."'
The University's investigation must be fundamentally fair and
unbiased. Its procedures must provide for a reasonable level of
confidentiality, and assurances of protection from retaliation for
Naomi, and all witnesses.263 Merely being dissatisfied with the
outcome of an investigation is not sufficient to establish "deliberate
indifference."2
If the University determines that sexual harassment did occur or is
ongoing, it must take prompt, remedial action. The University's
actions must be reasonably designed to stop the harassment and
prevent it from reoccurring. The University must tailor its remedial
actions to the nature of the harassment, and can include a variety of
actions, such as transfers, reassignments, education or training, the
provision of support services, publishing or reestablishing the
University's sexual harassment policy.
If the harassment stops after the University instituted its corrective
actions, it is more likely that Naomi can not demonstrate a
"deliberate indifference.' 265  Conversely, the mere fact that the
harassment does not stop after the University took corrective
measures does not automatically result in its liability. The University
will not be liable if its corrective measures were reasonably designed
to stop the harassment. 266
1445, 1999 WL 22733, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) (holding that the Board of Education was
not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's allegations because it began an investigation on the day
it received her complaint, removed her from harasser's class within seven days, and placed the
harasser (a teacher) on a behavior modification program); Bracey v. Buchanan, 55 F. Supp. 2d
416, 420 (E.D. Va. 1999) (deciding that plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the results of the college's
investigation does not establish deliberate indifference); Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F.
Supp. 2d 911, 919 n.8 (S.D.Ohio, 1998) (stating that, although the plaintiff was "left in the
dark" about the remedial action taken against the assistant coach (her alleged harasser), the
University was not deliberately indifferent to her complaint where it conducted an
investigation, counseled the assistant coach, and placed a written letter of reprimand in his
file).
262. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12043.
263. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12043.
264. Bracey, 55 F. Supp.2d at 420.
265. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1672 (1999) (concluding
deliberate indifference is a reasonable standard to judge a school board's liability).
266. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the school district's response, upon receiving notice of sexual harassment allegations, did not
amount to deliberate indifference where it conducted an investigation and initiated
termination proceedings against the teacher-harasser as soon as it had conclusive evidence of
the teacher's improper sexual relationship); see also Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 910 (D. Minn. 1999) (claiming that the plaintiff "may demonstrate deliberate
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The University must also ensure that James' due process and
privacy rights are adequately protected. Its remedial action must
include appropriate discipline for James, and other steps reasonably
calculated to stop the harassment. The discipline must be consistent
with the University's overall disciplinary code, and satisfy other
requirements.
The dissent's critique of the majority opinion in Davis includes a
warning that enforcing school liability in cases of sexual harassment
may foster additional litigation against educational institutions. 7 For
example, if the harasser is a student with a disability, a school can
discipline him or her provided that it follows certain procedures, and
the alleged harassment is not a manifestation of the student's
disability. 2,3
Similarly, a student facing discipline for engaging in sexually
harassing conduct may claim that the educational institution will
violate his or her right to freedom of expression that is guaranteed
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 69 In post-
secondary education in particular, "examining the conflict between
protections against sexual harassment and freedom of speech in the
academic context raises additional issues beyond the usual
employment setting because of the central value of academic
freedom and [the educational institution's] commitment to
unfettered debate.2 70
indifference by showing that a school district took only minor steps to address the harassment
with the knowledge that such steps would be ineffective"). The school district failed to
discipline or counsel the harasser, "segregate him from plaintiff, or even to report plaintiff's
complaints about him." Id. at 911. H.M. v.Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 719 So. 2d 793, 795-
96 (Ala. 1998) (stating that there vas adequate response to the allegations when the teacher
who received notice of the complaint notified school administrators who promptly investigated
the claim, placed the teacher on leave, initiated termination proceedings and notified local law
enforcement officials).
267. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1687-91.
268. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (stating that the purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act is to ensure that the rights of disabled children are protected); 29 U.S.CA § 794 (1994 &
'West Supp. 1999) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in Section 706(20) of this title, shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subject to discrimination
under any [federally funded] program or activity....").
269. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
270. Anita Cava and Beverly Earle, The Collision of Rights and a Search for Limits: Free Speech in
the Academy and Freedom from Sexual Harassment on Campus, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L., 282,
285 (1997). The Commentators demonstrate that cases of sexual harassment that arise in the
"particularly tolerant environment of a university requires courts to wrestle with defenses not
usually raised with vigor in Title VII claims." Id. at 298. They conclude that "cases involving
charges... between professional colleagues do not seem to pose stark problems for courts
outside of the general First Amendment concerns that sexual harassment law seeks to penalize
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The Supreme Court has balanced these competing interests in
cases involving public high school students. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,27' it held that the school's
enforcement of its disciplinary rules infringed upon the right of
students to express their views. 27 ' The Supreme Court held that the
school could not constitutionally prohibit students from wearing
black armbands to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities
"without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline." '73 Noting that "[s] chool
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students,"'2 74 the
Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the students' protest did not
interrupt school activities, nor did it intrude in the lives of others. '
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraserys the Supreme Court once
again balanced the free speech rights of a student with the
educational institution's "interest in teaching students the boundaries
of socially appropriate behavior."27 7  The Court found that the
"School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon [plaintiff student] in response to his
offensively lewd and indecent speech" before an assembly of 600 high
school students.278
While the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that a "nondisruptive,
passive expression of a political viewpoint... 'did not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the
rights of other students,' 279 it distinguished Bethel from its holding in
Tinker.2s  In Bethel, the speech was "unrelated to any political
viewpoint," was directed at a school audience of students-some as
young as 14 years of age-and its vulgar content was "wholly
inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school
education."28 ' The Supreme Court emphasized the role of public
schools in "'inculcat[ing the] fundamental values necessary to the
and curtail some speech that rises to the level of harassment. The problems, however, seem
much more acute where professors are alleged to have harassed students." Id. at 300.
271. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
272. Id. at 514.
273. Id. at 511.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 514.
276. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
277. Id. at 681.
278. Id. at 681, 685.
279. Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
280. Id- at 680.
281. Bethe4 478 U.S. at 683, 685.
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maintenance of a democratic political system 'and the role of
"school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-
especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit,
indecent, or lewd speech.283
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined these often
conflicting interests in Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George
Mason University. 4  The fraternity's "ugly woman contest," although
admittedly a crude attempt at humor, was considered offensively
sexist and racist by many in the audience."' The Fourth Circuit
determined that the University could not silence speech on the basis
of viewpoint despite "its substantial interest in maintaining an
educational environment [that is] free of discrimination."28 6 In Booher
v. Board of Regents, Northern Kentucky Universit8 , the district court
found that, despite the First Amendment guarantee, speech of a
sexual nature could be regulated if it is severe enough to create an
objectively (and subjectively) hostile or abusive environment.2ss Thus,
it struck down the University's policy, in part because its definition of
sexual harassment failed to indicate that offensive speech must be
measured against a standard reasonableness.289
282. Id. at 681, 683 (qoutingAmbach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
283. Id. at 684.
284. 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
285. Id. at 388.
286. Id. at 393.
287. 163 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 1998). In public educational institutions, teacher-employees are
protected insofar as their speech relates to matters of public concern. See Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). See Padilla v.
S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F. 3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding teacher's trial testimony
did not constitute protected speech); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983):
[wi]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matter of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior.
288. Booher, 163 F. Supp. at 27. Courts have restricted classroom speech that is of a sexual
nature if it does not serve a legitimate pedagogical purpose. See e.g., Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888
F. Supp. 293, 316 (D.N.H. 1994) (finding that University's policy "as applied to [professor's
classroom employ[ed] an impermissibly subjective standard that fail[ed] to take into account
the nation's interest in academic freedom .... "); McLellan v. Bd. of Regents, 921 S.W.2d 684,
691-92 (Tenn. 1996) (finding University's definition of sexual harassment in accordance with
United States Supreme Court holdings).
289. Booher, 163 F. Supp. at 28. In this case, a tenured professor of art attacked the sexual
harassment policy adopted by Northern Kentucky University as an unconstitutional
infringement on free speech. The court's inquiry involved a determination regarding "whether
the policy acts in a content-neutral fashion to prohibit the secondary effects of speech or
whether it impermissibly restricts the content of speech. The policy was deemed to be void for
vagueness. Id., at 24-25. The court referred to RA.V. v. City of St. Pau4 Minn. where the
Supreme Court invalidated as facially invalid under the First Amendment a city "hate speech"
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Challenges of "speech codes"29" have yielded the same result.
Although university administrators are applauded for their efforts to
create education environments that are free from discrimination, 
2 9 1
the federal courts generally invalidate those codes on the basis of
their vagueness and overbreadth.292
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's reliance on a Spending Clause analysis may
significantly affect the ability of students to obtain appropriate
remedies under Title IX for prohibited sexual harassment by teachers
or students. The Court's insistence on a student providing actual
notice of the harassing behavior to school officials obviously conflicts
with the practical realities of harassment within a school
environment. The documented reluctance of students, especially less
mature ones, to raise sexual harassment issues with school officials
may impinge upon their ability to invoke Title IX protection,
particularly in instances of teacher-on-student harassment.
When compared to the Supreme Court's handling of Title VII
harassment cases, especially the vicarious liability standard for
supervisory sexual harassment, the Gebser and Davis standards may
ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated disorderly conduct. 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992). In that
case, teenagers burned a cross on a black family's lawn and were charged with violating a city
ordinance. Id at 379-80. Although the Court acknowledged that speech can be curtailed in
very limited situations (obscenity, defamation, and fighting words), it held that the ordinance
impermissibly proscribed speech "on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." Id. at 381.
290. "In response to... concerns about harassment in the workplace and in order to
comply with the perceived requirements of Tide IX, many colleges and universities have
developed codes governing sexual and racial harassment." Cava and Earle, supra note 270, at
306.
291. The OCR provides two examples of the application of free speech rights to allegations
of sexual harassment. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12046. The first illustration involves a
college level creative writing class in which the professor's choice of reading assignments
includes descriptions of sexually explicit sexual conduct. OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at
12046. Here, where some students' essays contain similarly offensive language, academic
discourse is protected by the First Amendment, according to OCR. OCR Guidance, supra note
2, at 12046. In the second example, "a group of male students repeatedly targets a female
student for harassment during the bus ride home from school [by] making explicit sexual
comments about her body, passing around drawings that depict her engaging in sexual
conduct, and .... attempting to follow her home off the bus." OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at
12046. OCR considers such threatening and intimidating actions that are targeted at a
particular student or group of students to be outside the protection of the First Amendment.
OCR Guidance, supra note 2, at 12046.
292. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding the
code was overly vague where it proscribed language "that stigmatize[s] or victimize[s] an
individual."); UWM Post, Inv. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (stating that content-based speech is invalid where it is not based on the
fear of imminent violence); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-85 (6th Cir.
1995) (finding the policy vague, overbroad and "not a valid prohibition of fighting
words .... ").
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create an anomalous situation for harassed students. For example, in
Naomi's case, she may be able to establish a prima facie case under
Title VII employment standards for James' conduct as her supervisor
because actual notice to the University of his harassment is not
required. This may result in an inequitable circumstance in which
the University's liability turns on Naomi's status as an employee or a
student. It also establishes a situation where the Supreme Court
endorses a less rigorous standard for employees than for students
who should ordinarily receive greater protection given their
inexperience and lack of maturity.

